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OVERVIEW
In recent months, European financial markets have seen the continuation of the path of 
stabilisation initiated in the summer of 2012. Further, the headway in the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), one of the three institutional pillars of the Banking Union, has 
contributed to easing the notable tension prevalent on the financial markets to July 2012. 
However, despite this improvement in financial conditions, the situation on the markets 
has not yet fully returned to normal, and uncertainty and fragmentation remain high.
At the international level, expectations concerning the timing and speed of the withdrawal of 
the monetary stimuli in the United States have influenced — and will probably continue to do 
so in the near future — developments on financial markets.
In Spain, where economic activity fell markedly in the final stretch of 2012, the rate of 
contraction of GDP has progressively eased during the first half of 2013. The latest data show 
a slight increase in GDP in a setting in which exports continue to be the main underpinning of 
growth, although there are downside risks in the medium term. Stock market indices have 
risen in recent months, and the yield spreads on public debt and the credit risk premia on 
securities issued by the private sector have narrowed. Moreover, the fall-off in the recourse 
by Spanish banks to Eurosystem liquidity has continued.
The extensive and far-reaching reform of the banking sector continues on track, and is 
now at an advanced stage. Virtually all the measures contained in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) have now been implemented. The objectives are being met on 
schedule and the measures are being applied correctly, as reflected in the preliminary 
conclusions published in late September by the European Commission (EC), the ECB and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) following its recent visit to monitor the programme of 
financial assistance to the Spanish banking sector. As a result of these measures, capital, 
liquidity and efficiency levels of the financial system have been bolstered, as has the 
framework of governance, regulation and supervision of the Spanish banking sector. 
Further, the statements by the EC, ECB and IMF assess favourably the development by 
the Banco de España of a tool to regularly conduct forward-looking analyses of Spanish 
banks under different scenarios.
The banking sector has pursued its business in recent months in a setting marked by the 
easing of tensions on European financial markets, by the weakness of the real economy 
and by its own ongoing restructuring and recapitalisation process. Furthermore, the 
correction of the excessive debt of households and firms — one of the main imbalances 
in our economy — has continued. Against this background, business lending to the 
resident private sector in Spain has continued to fall, although in recent months the path 
of decline observed since 2011 has moderated. The decline can be seen practically 
across the board for the different institutional sectors and sectors of activity. In terms of 
banks’ exposure, the decline is also generalised, although it is less marked for those 
banks not subject to restructuring plans.
The doubtful assets of the private sector have continued to increase, except in construction 
and real estate development, although the decline in these sectors is principally due to 
the transfer of assets to Sareb. As a result of the review of the accounting classification 
of refinanced and restructured portfolios which the Banco de España requested of banks, 
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there is likely to be an upward revision of doubtful assets, whose impact on results can, it 
is estimated, be borne by banks. The doubtful loans ratio for credit to the resident private 
sector has continued to grow in a relatively generalised way across households and non-
financial corporations. However, the downward dynamic of lending has progressively 
gained in relative importance as an explanatory factor of the rise in the doubtful loans ratio 
over the past year.
The improved funding conditions on wholesale financial markets in recent months have 
been manifest in the fall in the systemic risk indicators for Spain, and in the significant 
reduction in the gross recourse to the Eurosystem by Spanish banks. Since autumn 2012, 
the deposits of households and non-financial corporations have increased, posting 
increasingly higher year-on-year rates of change. The growth in 2013 of bank deposits, 
along with the gradual deleveraging by households and firms, is prompting a progressive 
correction of the Spanish banking sector’s retail funding gap.
Following its heavy losses in 2012, the Spanish banking sector as a whole posted positive 
results in the first half of 2013. The improvement is due chiefly to the lower provisioning by 
banks following the extraordinary drive last year in the wake of the asset value adjustments 
relating to real estate development activity. Margins are subject to pressures derived from 
the weak economic climate, which affects the volume of business and that of non-performing 
loans, in a setting of low interest rates. This situation should lead banks to persevere with 
their policies to cut operating costs and achieve gains in efficiency.
Capital levels have recently risen appreciably for Spanish banks as a whole, owing to both 
the ongoing recapitalisation of the Group 1 and 2 banks, and the improvement shown by 
other banks over the past year. Despite improved solvency ratios, banks must continue 
striving to strengthen their regulatory capital, which is what lay behind the recommendation 
issued last June concerning dividend distribution policy.
Chapter 3 of this FSR presents for the first time the progress made by the Banco de España 
in developing a tool which enables forward-looking analyses to be made to assess the 
sensitivity of Spanish banks’ solvency to different macroeconomic scenarios, and which 
will be part of the supervisor’s toolkit. The tool will be subject to a process of continuous 
refinements over time so that best practices in the field may be incorporated and, in turn, 
so that the needs of the supervisor may be met. The initial results available, which are set 
out in Chapter 3, show that the set of institutions analysed are in a comfortable position in 
terms of solvency under the three macroeconomic scenarios considered.
In sum, the reform, restructuring and recapitalisation of the Spanish banking sector has 
continued to make headway in 2013 following the course envisaged in the MoU. The 
achievements in terms of banks’ solvency and liquidity, and of the regulation and 
supervision of the sector, have contributed — along with the continuous easing of tensions 
on international financial markets — to increasing confidence and improving market 
sentiment as regards Spanish banks. The market perception of the situation of Spanish 
banks, judging by the substantial improvement in their share prices and in their price-to-
book value, has trended very favourably throughout the year. However, the still-fragile 
situation of the Spanish economy, the incomplete normalisation of euro area financial 
markets and the subsequent pressures on banks’ income statements will oblige banks to 
make additional cost-containment and capital-preservation efforts. In any event, the 
creation in the coming months of the SSM following the recent approval of the related 
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Community regulation, as a first step for setting up the Banking Union, marks a milestone 
in overcoming the imperfections identified during the crisis in the functioning of the 
Monetary Union. At the same time, it poses a major challenge for the Spanish and European 
banking system in terms of adaptation.
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1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
In recent months developments on international financial markets have been partly 
influenced by the expectations concerning the speed of withdrawal of the monetary stimuli 
in the United States, once the Federal Reserve announced in May the possibility that it 
would shortly begin gradually to reduce its asset purchases. By contrast, in the euro area 
the ECB has maintained its expansionary monetary policy stance, which has been 
bolstered by the 25 bp cut in official interest rates in May and by the announcement, in 
early July, that it would keep these rates at their current or lower levels for a prolonged 
period. In addition, it has stated it will maintain its fixed-rate tender procedures with full 
allotment at least until mid-2014. Other significant conditioning factors of recent 
developments on international financial markets have been the uncertainty over the 
problems in Syria, the release of more-favourable-than-expected macroeconomic data in 
some advanced economies and the progress on Banking Union in Europe, and, in 
particular, the approval by the European Parliament in September of the regulation 
providing for the start-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 
Against this background, the long-term yields on US debt have risen, passing through to 
the economies with a higher credit rating such as the United Kingdom and Germany, and 
prompting one-off increases in the volatility of traded prices (see Chart 1.1). In the European 
countries most affected by financial tensions, long-term sovereign debt yields have fallen 
somewhat or have risen, in general, to a lesser extent, with yield spreads narrowing. In the 
case of Spanish 10-year bonds, the spread over the German benchmark narrowed from 
levels close to 300 bp in late April to around 235 bp in late October. The credit risk premia 
on fixed-income securities issued by resident financial and non-financial corporations 
have also tended to lessen. This improvement in wholesale market funding conditions has 
been further reflected in the fall-off in Spanish banks’ recourse to Eurosystem liquidity. On 
the Spanish stock markets, the Ibex 35 has climbed 16% in the past three months, a gain 
above the rises in other developed countries’ market indices, such as the S&P 500 or the 
Euro Stoxx 50.
The emerging economies were particularly vulnerable to the global financial climate, and 
conditions on their markets trended unfavourably, acutely so when market expectations of 
a diminished monetary stimulus in the United States stepped up, although the situation 
differed from one country to another. Specifically, there have been heavy capital outflows 
associated with currency depreciations, declines in stock market prices and a widening of 
sovereign spreads, as well as bonds issues grinding to a halt in the summer months. There 
was a turnaround in this pattern in early September, in step with the subsequently 
confirmed prospect of the Federal Reserve purchases programme being maintained.
The macroeconomic data of recent months show some restructuring of global growth, 
whereby the emerging economies are losing momentum, though they continue to grow at 
higher rates than the advanced economies; at the same time, the incipient recovery in 
some of the developed countries appears to be firming. Indeed, in the main advanced 
economies outside the euro area, the improvement they had experienced in 2013 Q1 was 
confirmed in Q2, overcoming the weakness shown in the final stretch of the previous year. 
The indicators available for Q3 suggest these trends will continue, although the recovery 
remains fragile and the balance of risks remains on the downside. In the short run the 
prominent risks are those linked to the fiscal problems in the United States, the associated 
Developments on financial 
markets have been partly 
influenced by expectations 
concerning the withdrawal of 
the monetary stimuli in the 
United States. In the euro 
area, the expansionary 
monetary policy stance was 
maintained. Other conditioning 
factors of market 
developments have been the 
uncertainty over Syria, the 
more favourable macro data in 
some advanced countries and 
the progress on Banking 
Union in Europe.
Long-term interest rates have 
risen in the United States and 
in Germany. In Spain, 
government bond yield 
spreads have narrowed as 
have the credit risk premia on 
securities issued by the 
private sector, stock market 
indices have risen and banks’ 
recourse to the Eurosystem 
has continued to lessen. 
In the emerging economies, 
financial market conditions 
have trended adversely.
The emerging economies are 
losing momentum while there 
is confirmation of an incipient 
recovery in some advanced 
economies outside the euro 
area.
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future tightening of financial conditions, the start of the US monetary normalisation, the 
steepening of the slowdown in the emerging countries and the heightening of tensions in 
the Middle East.
In the euro area in 2013 Q2, GDP posted a quarter-on-quarter increase of 0.3%, following 
six consecutive quarters of declines (see Chart 1.2.A). However, this rebound is partly due 
to transitory factors, meaning that the medium-term growth outlook remains one of slow 
and gradual recovery, with downside risks. Against this background, the ECB’s September 
projection exercise, in comparison with that in June, revised GDP growth forecasts for 
2013 up 0.2 pp to -0.4%, while those for 2014 were cut by 0.1 pp to 1%.
In Spain, GDP posted a quarter-on-quarter decline of 0.1% in Q2, compared with the fall 
of 0.4% in the previous quarter. The INE flash estimate for Q3 shows a year-on-year 
increase in GDP of 0.1%. The more favourable economic performance was also perceptible 
in a decline in the pace of job destruction, which stood in the same period, according to 
the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA), at 2.9%, against 4.6% in March (see Chart 1.2.B). 
The unemployment rate dipped slightly from April to September, assisted by the less 
negative trend of employment and by seasonal factors, but it remains at very high levels 
close to 26%.
Euro area GDP grew once 
again in Q2 after six 
consecutive quarters of 
declines; but the medium-term 
outlook remains one of slow 
recovery, with downside risks. 
In Spain, the contraction in 
GDP eased in Q2 and 
increased slightly in Q3, 
checking the pace of job 
destruction.
SOURCES: Datastream, Reuters and Bloomberg.
a Euro area: 5-year iTraxx Europe Senior Financials. United States and United Kingdom: average 5-year CDS for commercial banks. 
Latest data: 30 October 2013.
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In parallel, household and corporate debt has continued to shrink, although the 
unfavourable behaviour of income has continued to restrict the fall in debt ratios, which 
remain at higher levels than the euro area average. According to the latest information from 
the Central Balance Sheet Data Office, the ordinary net profit of the reporting corporations 
fell by 14.9% year-on-year on the first half of 2013, which has made for a further fall-off in 
profitability. In the case of households, the difficulties arising from high unemployment 
rates and the adverse trend of income have been compounded by the decline in net 
wealth, essentially as a result of the fall in house prices, which has continued in recent 
months. These developments shape a scenario of high financial pressure in the households 
and non-financial corporations sector.
In the case of general government, the year-on-year increase in debt stood, in August, 
at around 18%, while the latest figures on the debt ratio, for 2013 Q2, place it at 92.3% 
of GDP.
In sum, since the publication of the last FSR, the pattern of improvement in financing 
conditions for the resident sectors on wholesale markets has continued, although these 
markets have not yet fully normalised. The latest data show a slight increase in GDP in 
Spain, although in the medium term there are downside risks.
The deleveraging of 
households and firms, which 
remain subject to a high 
degree of financial pressure, 
continues, … 
… as does the marked 
momentum of general 
government debt.
Financial conditions have not 
fully normalised and the risks 
linked to economic 
developments remain 
considerable
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2  DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
Total consolidated assets of deposit institutions, which include their business in Spain and 
that of their subsidiaries abroad, reached €3,747 billion in June 2013, showing a negative 
year-on-year rate of change of 6.7% (see Table 2.1). The decline in total assets was broad-
based across institutions, although it was sharper for the so-called Group 1 and 2 banks.1 
These groups of institutions accounted for 71% of the year-on-year reduction in 
consolidated assets since their assets fell 11.9% in June 2013, while the decrease for 
other deposit institutions was 5.7%.
Financing to the private sector, which includes credit and fixed income, declined by 8.1% 
in the last year (see memorandum item of Table 2.1), decreasing its weight in the balance 
sheet to 60.6% in June 2013 (61.5% in the previous year). Financing to the private sector 
fell as a consequence of the year-on-year reduction in credit to the private sector which 
decreased by 11% in June 2013; its relative weight in the balance sheet declined from 
58.8% in June 2012 to 56.1% in June 2013 (see Table 2.1). This behaviour was affected by 
the transfer of assets of Group 1 and 2 banks to Sareb. Thus, while the fall in credit was 
broad-based across institutions, it was notably sharper for Group 1 and 2 banks, which 
account for 6.3 pp of the 11% fall in credit for the sector as a whole, although the weight 
of these banks in total deposit institutions was 13.7% in June 2013 in terms of credit to the 
private sector.
The trend in fixed income to the private sector was the opposite to that of credit and in 
June 2013 it grew by 53.6% year-on-year. This increase partly reflects the subscription by 
the FROB of ordinary shares of institutions recapitalised through the contribution of 
securities issued by the ESM. It also shows the transfer of assets to Sareb since the Group 
1 and 2 banks received State-guaranteed senior bonds in consideration for the transferred 
assets from Sareb.
Financing to general government (credit and fixed income) increased by 7.6% year-on-
year in June 2013. Also, in this case credit and fixed income performed differently. While 
credit fell at a rate of 13.7% in year-on-year terms, fixed income grew by 17.2% in the 
same period, partly owing to the conversion into securities of a portion of the loan for the 
financing of suppliers. The weight of financing to general government in the consolidated 
balance sheet increased over the last year from 11.8% in June 2012 to 13.5% in June 
2013 (see memorandum item of Table 2.1).
Total doubtful assets at the consolidated balance sheet level grew by 5.1% year-on-year in 
June 2013, a more moderate rate than that observed in December 2012 (18.9% year-on-
year) and that in June 2012 (34.5%). As described in greater detail below, when analysing 
changes in doubtful assets in credit to the private sector in business in Spain, the moderation 
2.1 Banking risks
2.1.1  CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET 
OF DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
Deposit institutions’ 
total consolidated assets 
decreased by 6.7% 
in June 2013
The decrease in financing to 
the private sector was sharper 
for banks which transferred 
assets to Sareb
Financing to general 
government increased due 
to the trend in fixed income
The rate of increase of 
doubtful assets moderated, 
which is partly explained by 
the transfer of assets to Sareb
1  Groups 1 and 2 comprise those institutions which needed State aid to recapitalise and which transferred their 
real estate assets to Sareb (the asset management company for assets arising from bank restructuring) in 
December 2012 and in February 2013, respectively, as agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
for financial assistance to Spanish banks and the parameters defined in the restructuring plans approved by 
the European Commission on 28 November 2012 for Group 1 banks and on 20 December 2012 for Group 2 
banks. The effects of these asset transfers make it difficult to compare on a year-on-year basis some of the 
data presented in this report.
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in the rate of increase in doubtful assets is explained to a large degree by the transfers of 
real estate loans – part of which were classified as doubtful – to Sareb by Group 1 and 2 
banks and, to a lesser degree by a slight moderation in the growth rate of doubtful assets 
for other institutions. In any event, the reduction in credit to the private sector and the 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The remaining assets and liabilities entries not explicitly considered, including valuation adjustments, are included in "Other".
b Difference between funds received in liquidity providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. September 2013 data (latest available) and 
September 2012 data to maintain the year-on-year comparison.
c Difference calculated in bp.
Jun-13
Change
Jun-13/
Jun-12
Relative
Weight
Jun-12
Relative
Weight
Jun-13
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Cash and balances with central banks 129,483 -11.4 3.6 3.5
Loans and advances to credit institutions 238,932 4.9 5.7 6.4
General government 107,859 -13.7 3.1 2.9
Other private sectors 2,100,522 -11.0 58.8 56.1
Debt securities 643,395 19.0 13.5 17.2
Other equity instruments 35,825 -4.3 0.9 1.0
Investments 53,680 -4.2 1.4 1.4
Derivatives 213,403 -19.9 6.6 5.7
Tangible assets 47,897 -4.2 1.2 1.3
Other (a) 175,684 -14.6 5.1 4.7
TOTAL ASSETS 3,746,680 -6.7 100 100
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Financing to private sector 2,270,646 -8.1 61.5 60.6
Financing to general government 507,520 7.6 11.8 13.5
Total doubtful assets 204,121 5.1 4.8 5.4
Total doubtful assets ratio 6.6 63 (c)
Provisions for bad debts and country risk 126,802 6.6 3.0 3.4
(€m) (%) (%) (%)
Balances from central banks 272,483 -33.8 10.3 7.3
Deposits from credit institutions 444,504 -4.6 11.6 11.9
General government 111,061 16.3 2.4 3.0
Other private sectors 1,755,035 0.5 43.5 46.8
Marketable debt securities 447,167 -11.9 12.6 11.9
Derivatives 194,976 -19.6 6.0 5.2
Subordinated debt 42,214 -42.1 1.8 1.1
Provisions for pensions, tax and other 37,564 13.2 0.8 1.0
Other (a) 211,815 -4.9 5.5 5.7
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,516,817 -7.4 94.6 93.9
MEMORANDUM ITEMS
Eurosystem net lending (b) 241,089 9.4 6.4
Minority interests 25,909 9.7 0.6 0.7
Valuation adjustments relating to total equity -16,362 . -0.4 -0.4
Own funds 220,317 4.9 5.2 5.9
TOTAL EQUITY 229,863 6.3 5.4 6.1
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY 3,746,680 -6.7 100 100
Assets
Liabilities and equity
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET. 
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS 
TABLE 2.1
Jun-13
Change
Jun-13/
Jun-12
Relative
Weight
Jun-12
Relative
Weight
Jun-13
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increase in doubtful assets led to a rise in the overall doubtful assets ratio2 in the consolidated 
balance sheet of deposit institutions as a whole, from 6% in June 2012 to 6.6% in June 
2013. Provisions for bad debts and country risk increased in the last year (with a year-on-
year rate of change of 6.6% in June 2013; see memorandum item of Table 2.1).
Tangible assets declined, in year-on-year terms, by 4.2% (see Table 2.1), which is explained 
by the reduction in tangible assets for own use, against a backdrop of a decrease in the 
number of offices and of a readjustment of overhead costs by the Spanish banking sector.
The assets heading “Other” includes all those consolidated balance sheet items that are 
not explicitly shown in Table 2.1, including the amount of impairment allowances (mostly 
provisions for bad debts and country risk). Accordingly, this residual heading is made up 
of positive and negative elements (the above-mentioned impairment allowances). Its 
decline in June 2013 (14.6% year-on-year, see Table 2.1), is largely explained by the 
above-mentioned increase in provisions for bad debts and country risk.
Notable on the liabilities side was the decline posted in balances of central banks, which 
fell by 33.8% year-on-year in June 2013. This decline contrasted with the sharp increase 
recorded between June 2011 and June 2012. This was due to the operations of institutions 
with the Eurosystem. The latter provided long-term liquidity to institutions in the euro area 
owing to the tensions and dysfunctions in financial markets. These operations with the 
Eurosystem decreased notably during the last year and have continued to do so gradually 
both as a result of the improvement in financial markets and the recovery seen in non-
financial firms’ and households’ deposits.
Private-sector deposits grew at a year-on-year rate of 0.5% to June 2013 (see Table 2.1), 
compared with the decrease of 4% observed one year earlier. Given the decrease in 
assets, the relative weight of these deposits grew from 43.5% to 46.8% in the last year. 
More importantly, and as analysed subsequently in detail, the improvement, in terms of 
financing through private-sector deposits, is especially discernible when examining the 
deposits of non-financial firms and households, which reflect the retail financing of deposit 
institutions and which have reversed the trend of slight contraction that had been observed 
since mid-2012, by starting to show slightly positive year-on-year rates of change since 
the beginning of the year.
The total equity of deposit institutions grew at a year-on-year rate of 6.3% in June 2013, 
increasing its weight in total assets to 6.1% compared with 5.4% a year earlier (see Table 2.1). 
This increase was largely due to changes in institutions’ own funds which grew by 4.9% to 
reach 5.9% of total consolidated assets.
The year-on-year rate of change of credit to the resident private sector in business in 
Spain, according to individual financial statement data, was –12.8% in August 2013, which 
is the latest available data (see Chart 2.1.A). The severity of the decline in credit and the 
most recent trend have been compounded largely as a result first, of the transfer of 
property development loans of Groups 1 and 2 to Sareb in December 2012 and in February 
2013, respectively; and further, of the deleveraging processes commenced by these banks 
due to their restructuring plans. Excluding Group 1 and Group 2 banks from total institutions 
Net lending from the 
Eurosystem declined over 
the last year
Private-sector deposits 
reversed the trend of slight 
contraction that had been 
observed since mid-2012 to 
show positive year-on-year 
rates of change from the 
beginning of this year
2.1.2  CREDIT TO AND DOUBTFUL 
ASSETS OF THE RESIDENT 
PRIVATE SECTOR IN BUSINESS 
IN SPAIN (ID)
Credit to the resident private 
sector in business in Spain 
decreased in June 2013,…
2  For the purposes of this Report the “ratio de morosidad” and the “ratio de dudosos” are considered to be 
equivalent concepts (both are translated as “doubtful assets ratio”). In both cases they include assets that are 
doubtful by reason of being past-due (by more than 90 days) along with other transactions that are classified as 
doubtful even though they are not 90 days past-due.
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(see Chart 2.1.A) it can be observed that credit fell less sharply during 2013. From Q2 the 
rate of change, albeit still negative, was somewhat more moderate.
The latest available data which breakdown credit by institutional sector and sectors of 
activity (relating to June 2013) show a fall in credit to individuals of 5.6% year-on-year 
compared with a fall of 3.6% in June 2012. This performance was the same for Group 1 
and 2 banks and for the other institutions, although the decline has been more severe and 
has accelerated more in the last year for Group 1 and 2 banks (see Charts 2.1.B and C).
…both in terms of credit to 
individuals…
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Within credit to individuals, sharper rates of decline were observed in credit for purposes 
other than house purchase (–13.5% year-on-year in June 2013), a situation which is the 
same for Groups 1 and 2 and for the other institutions as a whole, whereas the rates of 
decline are steeper for Groups 1 and 2 (see Charts 2.1.B and C).
The reduction of credit to non-financial firms is concentrated in the construction and real 
estate activities sector, which for the institutions as a whole contracted at a year-on-year 
rate of 30.8% in June 2013, compared with a decline of credit in other business activities 
of 8.5% as of the same date. Credit to the construction and real estate development 
sector concentrates the effect of the transfer of assets to Sareb by Group 1 and 2 banks 
which explains negative rates of change of 72% for these groups of banks, that are 
significantly higher than for other deposit institutions (see Charts 2.1.B and C)
As indicated, for other business activities, that is excluding construction and real estate 
development, the rate of change of credit was also negative (–8.5% in June 2013), but less 
markedly so. In any event, there was also a higher fall in credit in other business sectors in 
June 2013 than a year earlier (–3.8%), which was relatively broad-based (see Chart 2.2.A). 
In terms of the respective groups of institutions, the conclusions are similar to those 
mentioned above for total credit, namely that for all institutions the reduction of credit 
continues, but both the pace and strength of the decline over the last year are greater for 
the banks in Groups 1 and 2.
The size of non-financial corporations can be approximated3 by the volume of bank debt 
reported to the CCR. On the basis of this approximation and focusing the analysis on the 
group of non-financial firms not engaging in construction and real estate development 
activities, the fall in credit is broad-based. Nevertheless, it can be seen that, except for the 
larger firms, for the others the rate of decline has tended to stabilise over recent months 
(see Chart 2.2.B). Larger non-financial firms, against a backdrop of improving conditions 
in financial markets, have been able to issue debt which may help to explain the 
developments observed in bank credit (see Chart 2.2.C). 
In short, the latest data available on changes in credit reflect a relatively broad-based 
decline for the different borrowers and sectors of activity. Within this general trend, 
differences persist both in the business sectors – most notably the fall of credit to 
construction and real estate development activities – and among banks. Those banks not 
transferring assets to Sareb show more moderate (albeit still negative) rates of change in 
relation to the rates of Group 1 and 2 banks, which are implementing asset reduction 
processes as required in their restructuring plans.4
The fall in credit, which has moderated in recent months, is in response to the difficult 
economic situation and to the correction of excessive debt built up during the economic 
boom. In addition to this are other factors such as that related to fragmentation problems 
still existing in the euro area, which mean higher financing costs for Spanish institutions 
than those which would arise from an expansionary stance of the single monetary 
policy; and lenders’ poorer perception of customers’ creditworthiness in the current 
economic setting.
… and to non-financial firms, 
where the reduction of credit 
is concentrated in the 
construction and real estate 
activities sector.
The reduction of credit 
is also seen at non-financial 
corporations of various sizes, 
although rates of decline 
stabilised somewhat, except 
for the larger firms which have 
resorted to a greater extent 
to financing in the financial 
markets
3  Circular 4/2013 of 27 September 2013 modifies the definition of SME in Banco de España Circular 3/2008 on 
the determination and control of minimum regulatory capital. Its entry into force, following its publication in the 
Official State Gazette of 12 October 2013, will facilitate compiling information to identify credit to SMEs.
4  Foreseeably, a substantial part of the fall due to this will be absorbed by other institutions not subject to 
restrictions. See Box 6.1 of the Banco de España’s Annual Report 2012.
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The doubtful assets of credit to the resident private sector in business in Spain, according 
to individual financial statement data, grew at a year-on-year rate of 4.4% in June 2013, 
compared with 39.4% a year earlier (see Chart 2.3.A). The latest available data confirm the 
stabilisation in the rate of increase of doubtful assets, which in August 2013 recorded year-
on-year growth of 0.7% (41.1% in the same month of 2012).
The sharp moderation in the rate of increase of doubtful assets is explained by the 
performance of doubtful assets related to construction and real estate development 
activities, which in June 2013 (the latest available data with this sectorisation, since their 
frequency is quarterly) recorded a year-on-year fall of 20.5%. The decrease of doubtful 
assets related to the construction and real estate development sector is explained by the 
transfer of assets to Sareb by Group 1 and 2 banks, whose volume of doubtful assets 
associated with this sector thus decreased by 72.5% in June 2013 in relation to the same 
period of 2012. The transfer to Sareb explains that for Group 1 and 2 banks doubtful 
assets of credit to the private sector in business in Spain declined at a year-on-year rate 
of 31.8% in June 2013, while for other institutions they increased as of the same date by 
24.7%, a slightly lower growth rate than a year earlier (26.3%).
Doubtful assets continued to 
increase albeit at a more 
moderate rate
The robust moderation of 
doubtful assets is explained 
by the transfer of assets to 
Sareb by Group 1 and 2 
banks, while the rate of 
increase for other institutions 
held at similar levels to those 
of the previous year
SOURCES: Central Credit Register (CCR), Banco de España and Dealogic.
a Corporation size is proxied by the volume of bank debt reported to the Banco de España Central Credit Register.
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Doubtful assets have continued to rise for other business sectors and for individuals. This 
is perceptible both for Group 1 and 2 banks and other banks. Thus, for individuals, doubtful 
assets grew year-on-year by 43.2% in June 2013. This performance of doubtful assets in 
credit to households can be seen in credit for house purchase and, slightly less markedly, 
in credit for other purposes (see Charts 2.3 A and B). Doubtful assets of firms other than 
construction and real-estate development increased by 44.2% in June 2013, a similar rate 
for all banks.
The most recent data on growth of doubtful assets must be assessed in the light of the 
review of the accounting classification of refinanced or restructured portfolios. The Banco 
de España requested institutions to perform this work in order to ensure the uniformity of 
the criteria to be applied to refinancing and restructuring which were published last April.5 
Institutions were requested to report the corresponding accounting effects to the Banco 
de España’s Inspection Department before 30 September. However, the institutions’ rate 
of progress has been varied and some have been able to advance these effects to a 
certain extent. These one-off effects will affect developments in doubtful assets and the 
doubtful assets ratios over coming months, insofar as this review will give rise to standard 
or substandard restructured loans being reclassified as doubtful (see Box 2.1).
The doubtful assets ratio of credit to the resident private sector in business in Spain 
reached 11.9% in June 2013, higher than the figure of 10% recorded a year earlier. The 
most recent data for August 2013, stood at 12.5%.
These developments in the doubtful assets ratio have been conditioned by several factors, 
including the transfer of real estate assets to Sareb. Consequently, the doubtful assets 
ratio for institutions which did not transfer assets amounted to 11.9% in August 2013, 
compared with 9.1% a year earlier; whereas Group 1 and 2 banks reduced their ratio from 
15.9% (17.9% in November 2012, one month prior to the transfer of assets of Group 1 
banks to Sareb) to 14.9%.
For other business sectors 
and individuals, the rate of 
increase of doubtful assets 
has continued,…
… and it will be pushed 
higher to some degree 
by the accounting review 
of refinanced portfolios 
requested by the Banco 
de España of institutions
The doubtful assets ratio 
of the resident private sector 
increased in the first half 
of 2013
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5  http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/COM/Supervision/regulacion/ficheros/en/documentoCE300413_en.pdf (See Box 2.1)
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BOX 2.1REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF REFINANCING AND RESTRUCTURING
other factors such as the grace period of transactions. In 
accordance with the provisions of Annex IX of CBE 4/2004 and the 
above-mentioned criteria, transactions shall be classified as sub-
standard, provided that there are no objective circumstances for 
them to be classified as doubtful or standard risks.
When the criteria on refinancing and restructuring were published, 
the Banco de España urged institutions to review, through a study 
on an individual basis of their transactions, the accounting 
classification of refinanced portfolios and the related accounting 
effects which might arise from that said review. The institutions 
were informed that they should report this exercise to the 
Inspection Services by 30 September 2013.
All the institutions met the deadline set, although some of them 
brought forward the review, incorporating it in the interim financial 
information for the first half of the year. The remainder of this Box 
describes the process followed by the Banco de España to 
undertake the analysis described and the preliminary results 
obtained for the system as a whole.
Process followed by the Banco de España
In order to promote uniform compliance by institutions with this 
review of the accounting classification of refinanced and 
restructured transactions, as well as their coverage, the Banco de 
España has carried out a strict process of coordination and 
verification of the criteria to be applied by the institutions, which 
has two phases.
– The first phase of the process, which was completed on the 
days leading up to 30 September, consisted of discussing 
with the institutions the main criteria that, in the opinion of the 
Banco de España, should be used to identify a transaction as 
refinanced. In this process of interaction with the industry, the 
different cases contained in the banking databases have been 
considered, with a notable improvement in the process of 
coordination of the application of the criteria.
 Institutions were required to study on an individual basis their 
entire portfolio, so that the process of self assessment will 
Banco de España Circular (CBE) 6/2012 of 28 December 2012, 
which amends CBE 4/2004, requires institutions to disclose in 
their annual accounts specific information relating to refinancing 
and restructuring transactions (amounts; classification as 
standard, sub-standard or doubtful exposures; coverage; and 
breakdown by purpose of the financing). Also, it introduces a 
precise definition of this type of transaction, which is already 
envisaged in CBE 4/2004 as a factor to consider in the assessment 
of possible loan impairment.
In accordance with CBE 6/2012, a refinancing transaction is 
defined as one that is granted for economic or legal reasons 
relating to (current or foreseeable) financial difficulties of the 
borrower to repay one or more transactions already granted, or 
under which the payments on such transactions are brought 
totally or partially up to date, in order to enable borrowers under 
repaid or refinanced transactions to pay their debt (principal and 
interest) because they are unable, or it is foreseeable that they will 
be unable, to comply in time and in form with its conditions. A 
restructuring transaction1 is defined in a similar manner to a 
refinancing transaction but refers to the modification of the 
financial conditions of the transaction in order to facilitate payment 
of the debt. Circular 6/2012 distinguishes these refinancing and 
restructuring transactions from others, with specific features, such 
as rolled-over or renegotiated transactions. 
The data reported by the institutions pursuant to CBE 6/2012 
presented, in the Banco de España’s opinion, differences between 
institutions which might be driven by diverse business and 
management profiles but also by discrepancies in the accounting 
policies used. For this reason, the Banco de España decided to 
develop a set of criteria that institutions must take into account in 
preparing and approving their refinancing policies and in the 
accounting classification of the transactions affected. These 
criteria are not a new regulation on this subject but a reference 
which institutions must follow so as to adequately comply with 
CBE 4/2004. The objective is to ensure consistent and uniform 
application of the rules throughout the banking industry so that 
reporting differences between institutions are only caused by 
different business and management models and not by divergent 
interpretations of the same accounting rules.
The criteria on refinancing and restructuring mainly envisage 
aspects such as determining the borrowers’ ability to pay and the 
up-to-date valuation of the collateral provided and, furthermore, 
€m Starting situation Situation following the corrections as at 30 September 2013
Standard 73,557 48,193
Sub-standard 37,218 40,888
Doubtful 71,660 92,224
CLASSIFICATION OF THE PORTFOLIO OF REFINANCED AND RESTRUCTURED LOANS 
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
1  For the purposes of this box, refinancing and restructuring transactions 
are considered equivalent, since they both have the same origin 
(economic or legal reasons relating to financial difficulties) and purpose 
(to help borrowers pay their debt).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2013
BOX 2.1REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF REFINANCING AND RESTRUCTURING (cont´d)
Preliminary data obtained
In order to standardise and process the results obtained from the 
study, the institutions were requested to provide preliminary data 
with the impact of the review at each of them. The first provisional 
results were received on 15 September, relating to March 2013 
data, the final data being sent on 30 September.
The preliminary information sent by the institutions and pending 
verification in the second phase of this work, shows that the 
percentage of loans that have been refinanced is particularly high 
in the real estate developers sector, 45% of the total loans, as 
against 12% for large firms, 16% for SMEs and 10% for retail 
mortgages. 
On the preliminary data, after applying the reclassification criteria 
mentioned above, the amount of standard assets within the 
refinanced portfolio would fall from €73,557 million to €48,193 
million, with doubtful rising from €71,660 million to €92,224 million. 
Thus, one can appreciate a sharp fall in the standard portfolio 
(35%), a moderate increase in the sub-standard category (10%) 
and a significant increase in the doubtful category (29%). 
Accordingly, there is a significant reclassification from the standard 
category to doubtful. This occurs in all segments, but it is in the 
real estate developers segment that the effect is most visible: 
standard assets fall by more than 50% in this sector, while in the 
rest the fall is one third.
As these figures show, institutions have reported a high degree of 
recognition of the deterioration of credit risk. When this report was 
written, on the basis of the preliminary data, which are subject to 
changes that might arise from the second phase of the above-
mentioned revision process, additional provisioning requirements 
amounted to around €5 billion. In any event, the institutions’ 
income statement will be able to withstand the provisioning 
requirements resulting from the exercise.
have included all kinds of transactions, irrespective of size. 
However, in this first phase the inspection teams of the Banco 
de España have been mainly focused on the correct 
identification of refinanced or restructured transactions that, 
due to their small size or characteristics, are not usually 
analysed individually (retail mortgage, consumer and SME 
portfolios).
– The second phase, currently under way, will involve finalising 
the reviews of the inspection teams, which will include an 
analysis of borrowers through specific samples and of the 
refinancing databases that have been requested. This will be 
done using a specially designed tool.
In the preparatory work for this study, the four risk indicators that 
are observed in refinancing and restructuring and that are 
considered relevant for their analysis were identified: ability to pay/
recurrent income; collateralisation; payment of outstanding 
interest; and maturity of the refinancing. Depending on the degree 
of compliance with these factors, it was considered that the 
institutions should classify the transactions into standard, sub-
standard or doubtful. The greater the compliance with the factors, 
the better the classification of the transaction.
Also, the “cure” criteria that sub-standard or doubtful transactions 
must observed to be upgraded in their classification following a 
refinancing or restructuring were defined. The cure criterion is 
related to the existence of sustained payment for 6 or 12 months, 
depending on the maturity of the transaction, or whether a capital 
reduction of at least 10% occurs.
With respect to the provision coverage of transactions, a 
minimum of 15% would be envisaged for sub-standard and 25% 
for doubtful, with the collateral taken into account to determine 
the provision base, provided that its value is supported by an up-
to-date valuation.
A second factor which explains the upward trend of the doubtful assets ratio is the fall in 
credit. Thus, the doubtful assets ratio increases because doubtful assets increase (the 
numerator of the ratio), but also because credit decreases (the denominator of the ratio). 
This second explanatory factor has become more important during recent months (see 
Chart 2.4.B), especially for Group 1 and 2 banks, since the transfer of assets to Sareb has 
come on top of the credit dynamics. For the other banks, credit dynamics also explain a 
growing percentage of the increase in the doubtful assets ratios, but to a lesser extent. 
Thus, in June 2013 it explained 23.4%, compared with 15.1% a year earlier.
The doubtful assets ratio by sector of activity, on quarterly data, was 30.8% in June 2013 
for construction and real estate development activities (see Chart 2.4.A). For the other 
sectors of activity, the doubtful assets ratio rose from 7.8% in June 2012 to 12.3% in June 
2013 (see Chart 2.4.A). The increase in the doubtful assets ratio for non-financial firms 
other than construction and real estate development ones was broad-based across 
sectors of activity, and among groups of institutions, although its rate of increase and level 
Credit dynamics as an 
explanatory factor of the rise 
in the doubtful assets ratio has 
gained relative importance 
during the last year.
The doubtful assets ratio 
increased across the board for 
non-financial corporations, 
although it continued to be 
significantly higher for 
construction and real estate 
development firms
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is higher for Group 1 and 2 banks (24.4% in June 2013, up 10.3 pp in the last year) than 
for the other institutions (10.1% in June 2013, up 3.6 pp since June 2012).
When non-financial corporations other than construction and real estate development 
firms are distinguished on the basis of their size, approximated by the volume of bank debt 
reported to the CCR, the doubtful assets ratio shows a rising profile for the firms irrespective 
of their size (see Chart 2.4.C). This general rising trend in the doubtful assets ratio by size 
class, is compatible with differences between size classes in the level of the doubtful 
assets ratio. Thus, the larger firms (with more than €25 million of bank debt reported to the 
CCR), with a relative weight in credit of 51% (see Chart 2.4.D), recorded the lowest doubtful 
assets ratio (8.7% in June 2013). For the other non-financial corporations, excluding 
construction and real estate development ones, the doubtful assets ratios are relatively 
similar by size class, ranging from 13% to 17.3%. Firms with a volume of bank debt 
reported to the CCR of up to €5 million, whose relative weight in credit is 31%, have a 
doubtful assets ratio of 15.2%.
The doubtful assets ratio also 
increased for non-financial 
corporations when they are 
distinguished by firm size
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Corporation size is proxied by the volume of bank debt reported to the Banco de España Central Credit Register.
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The doubtful assets ratio of individuals reached 5.8% in June 2013, compared with 3.8% 
a year earlier. Both the level of the ratio and its rate of increase were lower in credit for 
house purchase (5% in June 2013, 1.9 pp more than a year earlier) than in credit for 
purposes other than house purchase (10.2% in June 2013, 2.7 pp more than a year earlier; 
see Chart 2.4.A). The lower level of doubtful assets in credit for house purchase than in 
that for other purposes is also observed in the various groups of banks. Thus for Group 1 
and 2 banks the doubtful assets ratio of credit for house purchase was 6.7% in June 2013, 
against 17.2% in the case of credit for purposes other than house purchase. For other 
banks, the doubtful assets ratios of these segments were, respectively, 4.4% and 8.4%.
In short, the doubtful assets ratio of the resident private sector in business in Spain 
increased in the first half of 2013, this increase being fairly widespread across groups of 
banks and economic sectors. The rise in the doubtful assets ratio, however, is increasingly 
explained by the downward momentum of credit, the denominator of the ratio, and this 
effect will foreseeably continue in the coming months. Also, there will be isolated increases 
in the doubtful assets ratio as a result of the revision of refinanced loans which the Banco 
de España requested banks to carry out (see Box 2.1). In any event, regardless of any 
isolated effects such as that mentioned above, if the macroeconomic recovery does not 
become firmer, an additional increase in bank doubtful assets is very likely.
In June 2013 foreclosed assets (those whose ownership passes to banks as a result of 
legal debt enforcement proceedings or as a result of standard debt-settlement procedures 
between the debtor and the bank) decreased by 14.4% year-on-year, compared with 
growth of 28.7% a year earlier. However, this decrease was concentrated particularly in 
Group 1 and 2 banks (–71.2%), while the other banks as a whole posted a positive rate of 
change (20.7%), although the rate was lower than in June 2012 (28.8%).
In the last few months the Spanish stock market has improved, as reflected by the gains 
posted by the Ibex 35, while the spread of the 10-year Spanish government bond over the 
German benchmark has been falling gradually from its high in mid-2012 (see Chart 2.5.A). 
This improvement in funding conditions on the wholesale financial markets is also 
perceptible in the lower credit risk premia of securities issued by resident financial and 
non-financial firms.
The doubtful assets ratio of 
individuals increased, and 
both the increment in the ratio 
and its level were higher in 
credit for purposes other than 
house purchase
2.1.3  FUNDING OF THE BANKING 
SECTOR
In recent months funding 
conditions on wholesale 
financial markets have 
improved…
SOURCES: Datastream, ECB and Banco de España.
a Latest data: 30 October 2013.
b For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 from FSR May 2013.
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These developments in the financial markets are reflected in the progressive reduction of 
the level of systemic risk in Spain, measured through the SRI6 (see Chart 2.5.B). Despite 
isolated increases, the trend in the past year is downward and has taken the level of 
systemic risk to low levels near to those recorded in the period before the crisis. This 
decrease is reflected in all the markets whose information is condensed in the SRI (the 
securities, money, bank funding and government debt markets), where the levels of tension 
have dropped significantly since September 2012. In the last few weeks the narrowing of 
the spread between Spanish and German 10-year bonds has helped to keep reducing the 
level of systemic risk. Broadly, the decrease in the volatility of the aforementioned markets, 
along with the increase in confidence and the resulting improvement in market sentiment, 
explain the drop in the level of systemic risk in Spain over the past year.
Against this background, some Spanish banks have issued debt on the wholesale markets 
in 2013. These issues were most notable at the beginning of the year, when securities were 
being placed not only by the larger banks with an international presence, but also by others 
… in line with a notable 
decrease in the systemic risk 
indicators for Spain
The extent of Spanish banks’ 
recourse to the wholesale debt 
markets has varied both...
6  This indicator developed by the Banco de España is explained in Box 1.1 of the May 2013 Financial Stability 
Report. It is intended to reflect the situation of systemic risk in Spain and changes therein. 
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic and Banco de España.
a Latest data: 30 October 2013.
b Senior debt and covered bond issues are included. Retained issues are not included.
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of smaller relative size and with operations more focussed on Spain (see Chart 2.6.A). Then 
the activity of Spanish banks in the wholesale markets relaxed and held at more moderate 
levels. It came to a halt in the summer months and subsequently resumed with some 
additional issues being launched. In any event, the pace of debt issuance on wholesale 
markets by banks depends not only on financial market conditions, but also on each bank’s 
strategic objectives and their achievement during the year. In this respect, a strategic 
objective of many Spanish banks is to reduce their dependence on wholesale funds in their 
funding mix by raising the relative weight of retail deposits against a background of falls in 
lending. These factors and the still relatively high cost of wholesale issues (largely a result 
of financial market fragmentation) explain much of the decrease in issuance since the 
beginning of the year despite the improved financial market conditions.
The euro area money markets have continued to be characterised by weak activity. Thus, 
since the last FSR the volume of interbank market activity has not changed significantly, 
holding at levels below those of previous years. This trend is reflected in the EONIA trading 
volumes, which in 2012 continued their downward path to stand at a low at the end of that 
year (see Chart 2.6.B). However, since the beginning of 2013 there has been a certain, 
albeit moderate and discontinuous, increase in trading. For its part, the Spanish interbank 
market has performed similarly to the EONIA. 
In view of this lack of interbank market activity and the unlimited provision of liquidity by 
the Eurosystem, European credit institutions continued to resort extensively to Eurosystem 
funds. That said, 2013 saw a continuation of the downtrend in their recourse to these 
funds which began in summer 2012, when the ECB Governing Council announced its 
intention to intervene under certain conditions in the secondary markets for euro area 
sovereign debt. Thereafter, the ability of some European banks to raise funds on the 
primary markets improved considerably, allowing them to lower their purchases in new 
tenders and to begin repaying early a portion of the funds received in the two 3-year 
tenders allotted in late 2011 and early 2012. The outstanding balance of the ECB tenders 
(Chart 2.6.C) for the total Eurosystem and for banks resident in Spain shows how, from the 
end of September 2012 to the end of September 2013, banks resident in Spain reduced 
their gross recourse to the Eurosystem by €142 billion (–37%), while the outstanding 
balance in the total Eurosystem decreased by €409 billion (–35%).
Consequently, the share of loans to Spanish banks in the total Eurosystem decreased in 
this period. The weight of the outstanding balance of tender allotments to Spanish-resident 
banks with respect to the total provided by the Eurosystem was 31% in September 2013, 
compared with an average of 33% a year earlier.
The relative improvement in the funding conditions faced by Spanish banks is reflected in 
the behaviour of deposits from households and non-financial corporations. The most 
recent data available, relating to August 2013, show a year-on-year change of 7.7% (see 
Chart 2.7.A), in the same line as the positive year-on-year rates of change recorded since 
the beginning of 2013, after the negative trend last year manifested by year-on-year falls 
in deposits from households and non-financial corporations of around 6% at mid-2012. 
The retail funding raised by banks includes not only deposits from households and non-
financial corporations, but also other fixed-income instruments, such as promissory notes, 
which can act as substitutes of the former from the standpoint of households and firms, 
but do not alter the basis of retail funding for banks. This type of fixed-income securities 
attracted greater commercial interest in relation to deposits as a result of the 2011 changes 
...across banks 
and during the year
Since the beginning of 2013 
interbank market trading 
has shown a certain 
increase, albeit moderate 
and discontinuous
Spanish banks significantly 
reduced their gross 
recourse to the Eurosystem 
in the past year
The year-on-year growth rates 
of deposits from households 
and non-financial corporations 
continue to rise…
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in the contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Fund based on the risks assumed (fixed-
income securities are not subject to such contributions). This interest has gradually faded 
owing to further changes in deposit-related contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Fund 
in August 2012. 
In any event, analysis of the total of deposits and fixed-income securities which are issued 
by banks and held by households and non-financial corporations shows that the retail 
funds raised by banks fell in 2012 (–2% year-on-year), but that the fall was much smaller 
than the aforementioned –6% decrease in deposits. The aforementioned recovery in 
deposits in the year to date is also apparent when these are analysed on an overall basis 
with securities. Thus positive year-on-year rates of change have been recorded in 2013 
and the latest figure available, that for August 2013, was a rate of 3.6%.
This recent behaviour of deposits, along with the progressive deleveraging of the banking 
sector, is producing a progressive narrowing of the retail funding gap, i.e. the difference 
between loans and retail deposits (see Chart 2.7.B). The asset transfer to Sareb in 
December 2012 and in February 2013 by the Group 1 and 2 banks, respectively, is apparent 
in the greater intensity of deleveraging in those months, although it does not alter the 
observed general trend of progressive reduction in the retail funding gap.
Throughout 2013 the net assets of investment funds reversed the downward trend which 
has charactised their behaviour since the outset of the crisis, whereas the net assets of 
pension funds maintained their trend of relative stability (see Chart 2.8.A). The net assets 
of investment funds increased by more than €5 billion in each of the first two quarters of 
2013 (see Chart 2.8.A). This increase was explained by both the positive yields (except in 
June) and the higher net subscriptions, particularly the latter, whose contribution to the 
change in net assets of the funds was positive in all months of 2013, breaking the trend of 
negative net subscriptions initiated in March 2011 (see Chart 2.8.B). Net subscriptions 
increased in 2013 in all types of funds (money market, bond, equity and international), 
showing steady growth except in equity funds, whose behaviour was more unsteady 
during the year. The reason for this trend may be the relative improvement in the financial 
…a trend which persists when 
the analysis also includes the 
fixed-income securities issued 
by banks which are held by 
households and non-financial 
corporations 
The behaviour of loans and 
deposits explains the 
progressive narrowing of the 
retail funding gap of the 
Spanish banking sector
Investment funds, amidst 
a certain improvement 
in the financial markets, 
have recorded positive net 
subscriptions since the start 
of 2013
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Loans to households and non-jnancial jrms net of provisions. Deposits from households and non-jnancial jrms plus jxed-income securities of credit institutions 
held by households and non-jnancial jrms.
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markets in 2013, prompted to some extent by the downtrend in bank deposit interest 
rates. In any event, the substitution effects between investment funds and bank deposits 
are relatively limited, taking into account that the cumulative net subscriptions to date 
amount to 1.3% of the volume of deposits and fixed-income securities of credit institutions 
held by households and non-financial corporations, and that these products have different 
risk characteristics. 
Deposit-taking institutions recorded consolidated income attributable to the controlling 
entity of €8,246 million between January and June 2013 (see Table 2.2), which contrasts 
with the negative income of somewhat more than €3 billion in the same period of the 
previous year. The positive income posted in June 2013 by banks as a whole signified a 
return on assets (ROA) of 0.45%, against –0.17% in the previous year. The return on equity 
(ROE) was 7.8% in June 2013, contrasting with the –3% observed in June 2012.
A portion of the income of total deposit-taking institutions to June 2013 was obtained by 
the Group 1 and 2 banks (see Chart 2.9.A), which recorded very high losses in 2012, in 
which year the financial system incurred a loss of around €43 billion, largely due to the 
provisions which had to be set aside in that period. 
In this respect, some of the improvement in the results of deposit-taking insitutions as a 
whole and of those belonging to Groups 1 and 2 was due to the lower provisions recorded 
this year compared with the previous year, when banks had to meet the additional 
requirements imposed by Royal Decree Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 passed in the first half 
of 2012, requiring an extraordinary effort from them. These lower provisioning needs offset 
the downward pressure on business margins, particularly the net interest margin, in a 
setting of low interest rates, weaker lending activity and rising doubtful assets, which do 
not earn interest.
Net interest income declined by 10.8% year-on-year7 between January and June 2013, 
with falls in both financial revenues (12.9%) and financial costs (15.4%). In terms of average 
total assets, net interest income fell from 1.86% in June 2012 to 1.7% in June 2013. 
2.2 Profitability
The Spanish banking sector 
recorded a profit in June 2013 
following the sizeable loss 
of 2012
A large part of the 
improvement in the income 
statement is explained by the 
lower provisions than in 2012 
as a result of Royal Decree-
Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012
Net interest income fell in June 
2013, in year-on-year terms …
7  In 2012 various integration processes were carried out between institutions, so that the perimeter changed 
between 2012 and 2013. This affects the comparability of these years, and in particular tends to reduce the rates 
of change of the various income statement items, albeit not very significantly, so that the growth of net interest 
income would have been slightly greater had this effect not occurred.
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This decline in net interest income was seen both in business in Spain and in business 
abroad, although it was more pronounced in the former. On individual financial statement 
data, there was a significant fall, of 17% in June 2013 in relation to the same period a year 
earlier. This decline in net interest income is partly explained by the reduction in activity, 
against a background of falling credit, but is mostly attributable to the negative evolution 
of average lending rates and average borrowing costs (price effect; see Chart 2.9.B). The 
notable reduction in interest rates, and in particular in Euribor, between the first half of 
2012 (1.48% on average) and the first half of 2013 (0.54% on average), translated into a 
decline in the return on assets (downward repricing of the portfolio), which was greater 
than the reduction observed in the average cost of borrowing, partly due to a lower 
remuneration of deposits, leading to a decline in the spread between these two periods. 
The above-mentioned reduction in net interest income was observed for Group 1 and 2 
banks and for other banks alike.
Net fees and commissions fell by 3.1% in June 2013 year-on-year, although in terms of 
ATA the change was not significant. Within fees and commissions, those associated with 
the selling of financial products grew most, while the largest year-on-year falls were 
recorded by those others linked to credit and debit card services and to securities services. 
The decline in net fees and commissions was much more notable at institutions belonging 
to Groups 1 and 2 (–11.9% year-on-year, as against a fall of 2.1% at other deposit 
institutions), which is probably related to the lower activity of these institutions in the 
context of their restructuring plans.
… as a consequence of the 
lower level of activity and, 
especially, of the evolution of 
average lending and 
borrowing rates
Fees and commissions, in 
particular those most closely 
linked to banking activity, have 
fallen…
Jun-12 Jun-13
€m
% Change
Jun-13/Jun-12
% ATA % ATA
Financial revenue 61,268 -12.9 3.74 3.35
Financial costs 30,131 -15.4 1.89 1.65
Net interest income 31,137 -10.8 1.86 1.70
Return from capital instruments 639 -43.8 0.06 0.03
dohtem ytiuqe eht gnisu rofdetnuocca seititne fo ssol ro tiforp fo erahS 2,920 98.9 0.08 0.16
Net commissions 11,600 -3.1 0.64 0.64
seitilibail dnastessa laicnanif no sessol dna sniaG 9,145 104.3 0.24 0.50
Other operating income -1,481 — -0.08 -0.08
Gross income 53,961 3.4 2.78 2.95
Operating expenses 26,026 4.1 1.33 1.42
Net operating income 27,935 2.7 1.45 1.53
)snoisivorp lareneg dna cificeps(sessol tnemriapmi tessA 16,930 -41.9 1.55 0.93
Provisioning expense (net) 2,413 -16.6 0.15 0.13
Operating projt 8,592 — -0.26 0.47
Asset impairment losses (assets other than loans and credits) 2,163 -50.2 0.23 0.12
Income from disposals (net) 4,612 240.1 0.07 0.25
Projt before tax 11,040 — -0.42 0.60
Net income 9,429 — -0.25 0.52
MEMORANDUM ITEM
    Income attributable to the controlling entity 8,246 — -0.17 0.45
Jun-13
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 
Deposit institutions. January-June 2013 
TABLE 2.2
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2013
Gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities increased between June 2012 and June 
2013 very notably, to reach €9,145 million. The improved performance of gains and losses 
on financial assets and liabilities is observed both in the case of Group 1 and 2 banks and 
in that of other banks. However, the increase in the gains and losses on financial assets 
and liabilities was significantly greater for the Group 1 and 2 banks (an increase of 335% 
in the reference period), which is explained by the existence of a non-recurring gain arising 
from hybrid instrument management exercises. 
Operating expenses grew by 4.1% year-on-year in June 2013. There was a significant 
difference in the behaviour of the growth of operating expenses between Group 1 and 2 
banks (fall of 13.2% in June 2013 year-on-year) and other banks (increase in operating 
expenses of 6.3%). The increase in operating expenses for institutions not belonging to 
Groups 1 and 2 is explained by staff compensation expenses incurred in the first half by 
certain institutions conducting workforce restructuring processes. 
Spanish institutions are continuing to reduce their staff and offices, in an attempt to reduce 
their operating costs. From the highs reached in June 2008, Group 1 and 2 banks have 
reduced the number of their employees by some 30%, which is similar to the percentage 
reduction in the number of offices. This means that office numbers now stand at their late 
1990s levels, while employees are at the level existing in around 2000. In addition, from now 
until 2017, according to the restructuring plans associated with the recapitalisation of these 
institutions, there will be reductions of around 50% from the highs reached in June 2008 
(see Chart 2.10.A and B). For other institutions, there were also significant falls in the number 
of offices and employees between June 2008 and June 2013 (see Chart 2.10.A and B).
Asset impairment losses, which show specific and general provisions, fell very significantly 
last year (–41.9% in June 2013). In terms of ATA, the reduction was similar, from 1.55% of 
ATA in June 2012 to 0.93% a year later. Although most provisions made by institutions in 
2012 as a consequence of RDLs 2/2012 and 18/2012 were concentrated in the latter part 
of the year, many institutions, to a greater or lesser degree, made some of the provisions 
in the first half of the year. Thus, although doubtful assets, in an economic context like the 
… while gains and losses on 
financial assets and liabilities 
rose significantly, although 
they were boosted by one-off 
operations
Institutions continue to reduce 
offices and staff, as part of the 
process of restructuring their 
operating costs
Asset impairment losses 
declined significantly last year, 
as in 2012 they were boosted 
by RDLs 2/2012 and 18/2012
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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present one, continued to increase, the provisions to be made, in comparison with those 
recorded in 2012, fell significantly, from more than 100% of net operating income in June 
and December 2012 to 61% in June 2013.
Impairment losses on other assets, largely relating to foreclosed assets, behaved similarly, 
for the same reasons, with a sharp fall in relation to June 2012 (–50.2%) and a significant 
fall as a proportion of ATA (0.23% in June 2012 as against 0.12% a year later). Also, the 
percentage by which they reduce net operating income fell, from 16% in June 2012 and 
35% in December 2012, to 8% in June 2013.
In short, the consolidated earnings of Spanish institutions have moved from heavy losses 
in 2012 to positive levels in the first half of 2013. This is basically a consequence of the 
lower provisioning required, following the extraordinary efforts made last year as a result 
of the adjustments to the valuation of assets relating to property development. Margins are 
under pressure from the lower volumes of activity, the high level of non-productive assets 
and the net flow of doubtful assets, against a background of low interest rates, which 
restrict income from financial activity. The leeway available to institutions to face the 
challenges deriving from the current macroeconomic context is limited, which should lead 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AND OFFICES. BUSINESS IN SPAIN 
Percentage change in June 2013 relative to the maximum (June 2008). Deposit institutions, ID 
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a To make the comparison homogeneous with the observed results in June, annual estimates by the external consultant are divided by two.
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them to persevere in their policy of containing operating costs and efficiency gains. In any 
event, it should be noted that in the current year to date, the net operating income 
generated by Spanish institutions in their business in Spain is greater than that considered 
by the external consultancy in the stress test last year, both under the adverse and the 
baseline scenarios (see Chart 2.11).
The solvency ratio of deposit institutions reached 12% in June 2013, an increase of 59 bp 
from June 2012 (see Chart 2.12). This increase shows the effect of the recapitalisations 
carried out last year, since not all the Group 1 and 2 banks had been recapitalised by mid-
2012. When these institutions excluded, the level of the ratio remains at 12.4% in both 
years. The tier 1 ratio for all institutions stood at 10.8%, up 1.1 pp from a year earlier. This 
ratio also increased in the case of institutions other than those in Groups 1 and 2, from 
10.6% in June 2012 to 11% in June 2013. Law 9/2012, implemented by CBE 7/2012, 
provides that credit institutions must have core capital of at least 9%, in accordance with 
recommendation 2011/1 of the European Banking Authority. Under this Law, institutions 
must comply with these new requirements from 1 January 2013. In June 2013, the core 
capital ratio according to Law 9/2012 stood at 10.5%.
Total own funds fell by 8.5% from June 2012 owing to the sharp reduction in tier 2 capital 
(34.5%) and the fall of 3.1% in tier 1 capital. This behaviour shows the change in profile 
that is occurring in the composition of own funds, given that higher quality capital is 
displacing other capital, as can be seen in the fact that its relative weight in the total has 
risen from 72% in June 2008 to 94% in mid-2013 (see Chart 2.13.B).
Within tier 1, capital continued to grow strongly (31.2% in June 2013), although it has 
slowed slightly (5.4 pp) since 2012. Its buoyancy was more than offset by the negative 
behaviour of reserves, the decline in which quickened to a fall of 21.8%, and by the fall in 
preference shares (see Chart 2.13.C).
The above-mentioned decline in tier 2 capital occurred through the reduction in 
subordinated financing, which decreased in June 2012 at a rate of 43.2% relative to the 
same period a year earlier (see Chart 2.13.D).
The fall in total requirements quickened after they decreased by 13% driven by requirements 
for credit risk which dropped at a rate of 14.7% (9 pp higher than the decline in June 2012) 
as a result of the ongoing reduction of credit (see Chart 2.13.A). 
2.3 Solvency
The solvency ratio increased 
for deposit institutions, due to 
the recapitalisation of the 
Group 1 and 2 banks and the 
improvement recorded by 
other banks over the past year
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in keeping with the decline in 
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As indicated above, the tier 1 ratio also improved for Group 1 and 2 banks. These banks 
combine an increase in capital, as a result of recapitalisation, with lower credit risk 
requirements.
Market perception of the situation of Spanish banks, in light of the substantial increase in 
their stock market prices, has improved. As a result of these developments the market’s 
assessment of these banks on the basis of their price to book value has improved, reflecting 
less mistrust of Spanish banks’ balance sheets following the restructuring process and the 
stress tests performed last year in Spain (see Chart 2.14.A). A comparison of the main listed 
Spanish banks and the main European ones on the basis of price to book value shows that 
Spanish banks are in a medium-high position in relation to their peers (see Chart 2.14.B). 
In any event, despite the improvement of Spanish banks’ solvency ratios and the market’s 
perception of their price to book value, in a setting in which, notwithstanding the signs of 
recovery, uncertainties remain about the economy in Spain and in the euro area, the Banco 
Market perception of Spanish 
banks, judging by their price 
to book value, has improved 
during the year
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND OWN FUNDS 
Deposit institutions excluding Group 1 and 2 institutions 
CHART 2.13
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
160 
-14 
-12 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
Weights 
Jun-13 
Jun-13 Jun-12 Jun-11 
 CREDIT, COUNTERPART, DILUTION AND DELIVERY RISKS  
 SETTLEMENT RISK 
 MARKET AND CURRENCY RISKS 
 OPERATIONAL RISK 
 TEMPORARY AND OTHER RISKS 
 RATE OF CHANGE 
%  % 
A. REQUIREMENTS. 
CONTRIBUTION TO RATE OF CHANGE AND COMPOSITION (right-hand scale) 
-20
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
Weights 
Jun-13 
Jun-13 Jun-12 Jun-11 
 TIER 1 
 TIER 2 
 OTHER 
 DEDUCTIONS 
 RATE OF CHANGE 
% % 
B. OWN FUNDS.  
CONTRIBUTION TO RATE OF CHANGE AND COMPOSITION (right-hand scale) 
0 
25 
50 
75 
100 
125 
-40 
-30 
-20 
-10 
0 
10 
Weights 
Jun-13 
Jun-13 Jun-12 Jun-11 
 SUBORDINATED DEBT AND SIMILAR INSTRUMENTS 
 GEN. PROV. AND AMOUNTS IN EXCESS OF EXPECTED LOSSES 
 CORRECTION TO VALUATION ADJUSTMENTS 
 REVALUATION RESERVES 
 WELFARE AND OTHER SPANISH FUNDS 
 DEDUCTIONS AND OTHER 
 RATE OF CHANGE 
% % 
D. TIER 2 CAPITAL.  
CONTRIBUTION TO RATE OF CHANGE AND COMPOSITION (right-hand scale) 
-40 
-20 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
140 
-25 
-20 
-15 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
Weights 
Jun-13 
Jun-13 Jun-12 Jun-11 
 CAPITAL 
 RESERVES  
 PREF. AND NON-VOTING SHARES AND OTHER SPANISH INSTRUMENTS 
 GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS
 
 OTHER DEDUCTIONS 
 RATE OF CHANGE 
% % 
C. TIER 1 CAPITAL.  
CONTRIBUTION TO RATE OF CHANGE AND COMPOSITION (right-hand scale) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2013
de España published a recommendation in June 2013 that dividend distribution policies 
should be guided by caution and ensuring that there is an adequate level of capital at all 
times. Thus, during 2013, it was recommended, taking into consideration the specific 
features of each institution, that cash dividends should not exceed 25% of attributable 
consolidated profit. Similarly, each institution should consider that payments in the form of 
shares, insofar as they are a recurring practice, must be commensurate with the growth of 
shares outstanding and with the earnings performance. This measure comes on top of the 
supervisory measures adopted in accordance with the MoU signed by the Spanish and 
European authorities which, together with the institutions’ own actions, currently ensure 
that there are appropriate solvency levels based on the risks assumed.
Delegations from the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF carried out the fourth 
review of the financial sector assistance programme for the Spanish banking sector 
between 16 and 27 September. These organisations have published8 the preliminary 
findings of their review which underlines that the reform programme of Spain’s financial 
sector remains on track9. They also mention, in order to enhance proactive monitoring of 
SOURCE: Datastream.
a Each pair of bars represents an institution.
b Each bar represents an institution. Latest data: 30 October 2013.
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8  Joint press release of the European Commission and the ECB: http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/
SalaPrensa/InformacionInteres/ReestructuracionSectorFinanciero/Arc/Fic/presbce2013_128e.pdf
   IMF press release: http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/InformacionInteres/Reestructuracion
SectorFinanciero/Arc/Fic/fmi300913en.pdf
9  Section 4.3 analyses this matter in more detail.
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the financial sector, the work by the Banco de España on a tool to develop forward-looking 
scenario exercises on Spanish banks on a regular basis. Accordingly, Chapter 3 of this 
report presents the initial results of the methodology developed by the Banco de España 
to undertake forward-looking analyses to evaluate the solvency of Spanish banks in 
various macroeconomic scenarios.
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3  DEVELOPMENT OF A TOOL TO REGULARLY CONDUCT FORWARD-LOOKING 
ANALYSES OF SPANISH BANKS. METHODOLOGY AND INITIAL AGGREGATE RESULTS
The last FSR indicated (in Box 2.3) that the Banco de España would include “prospective” 
or forward-looking analyses as part of the tool kit available to the supervisor to assess each 
bank and, were it necessary, to be able to take measures to correct their solvency situation. 
The Banco de España has thus adopted best international (US and UK) practices in the 
area, incorporating forward-looking analyses to its range of supervisory tools. The present 
chapter presents the work conducted since then by the Banco de España to equip itself 
with a tool (known as the FLESB — the Forward-Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks) that 
enables the solvency of Spanish banks in the face of different macroeconomic scenarios to 
be evaluated. It should be noted that this is not a forecast of the future solvency of 
institutions, but rather a sensitivity analysis in respect of a pre-determined set of shocks.
This tool will be subject to continuous improvement over time, both in the initial data it 
requires and in the calculation methods it uses. It is thereby sought to incorporate the best 
international practices in this area, in which connection assessment and advice has been 
sought from independent experts with long-dated experience in the field. 
What is presented in this FSR is, therefore, the first step of this evolutionary process, including 
the results obtained for the system as a whole. From a methodological perspective, the objective 
initially pursued has been to develop a framework enabling a sensitivity analysis to be conducted 
using the supervisor’s own models (a top-down approach), and therefore without the need to 
draw on each bank’s own models. Nevetherless, this framework is enriched with numerous 
granular elements (a bottom-up approach) at the level of individual loans, including their 
guarantees. These bottom-up elements stem from the information that banks gather, prepare 
and process in their lending and guarantee-management activities, and from the forward-
looking information they prepare on the different components of their income statements. 
The above-mentioned methodological developments have benefited substantially from 
interaction with the external consultant that carried out the bottom-up stress tests last 
year as part of the MoU between the Spanish and European authorities. This has allowed 
the tool’s application, scope and calibration to be improved. It will also provide for further 
improvements in the immediate future, particularly in methodological aspects and giving 
greater depth to elements already considered in the bottom-up approach. 
The rest of this chapter broadly describes the approach followed, detailing thereafter the 
most significant features of the methodology employed in the development of each of the 
parts making up the FLESB. It concludes with the results obtained for the system as a whole.
As stated, the aim of the FLESB is to evaluate the solvency of banks in the face of different 
scenarios over a specific time horizon. Hence, given macroeconomic scenarios that must 
be demanding but plausible, the tool calculates the expected losses over the related 
period of time, and compares these losses with the elements banks have at hand to 
withstand such losses. As Chart 3.1 shows, projecting expected losses requires that three 
basic parameters be calculated: probabilities of default, losses in the event of default and 
exposure in the event of default. The elements at hand at banks to withstand expected 
losses will be provisions previously set aside, the profits before provisions that are 
estimated for the horizon of the analysis and the capital buffer available. 
3.1  Objectives
3.2  General framework
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The macroeconomic scenarios used in an exercise such as that pursued with the FLESB (see 
the section on results for an analysis of the specific scenarios used) must be demanding, but 
plausible, since otherwise they would give rise to results that are difficult to interpret and, 
above all, to translate, if necessary, into supervisory actions. A baseline scenario is used 
which, subject to the uncertainty macroeconomic forecasting entails in general, is the best 
estimate of future macroeconomic developments. That is to say, it is the scenario that is most 
likely to occur. In addition to the baseline scenario, several alternative scenarios with a 
differing degree of severity are considered which, in any event, must conform to a minimum 
level of occurrence, in an attempt to measure the sensitivity of banks’ position to unfavourable, 
but plausible, changes in the economic environment. These alternative scenarios are 
generated in connection with the medium-term macroeconomic forecasting models regularly 
used by the Banco de España, by imposing adverse exogenous shocks on the baseline 
scenario.
Any tool for conducting forward-looking analyses with a high bottom-up component 
requires databases with a high level of granularity. The Banco de España has databases 
that offer a high degree of detail at the level of loans and borrowers, with information too 
on the collateral available. These are listed below:
—  Central Credit Register (CCR). The Banco de España receives monthly 
information on loans granted by each of the banks operating in Spain to their 
customers, grouped by specific characteristics, if the financing extended to 
such customers exceeds the minimum threshold of €6,000. The CCR 
information allows the banking book to be segmented into performing and 
doubtful loans, and also provides information about other relevant 
characteristics for analysing the risk associated with each lending operation 
with the same characteristics (maturity, collateral, sector of activity, province, 
etc.). The CCR information is used to estimate several of the parameters 
needed in the calculation of expected losses, such as probabilities of default, 
cure rates and the credit conversion factors.
3.3  Data needed 
for the analysis
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
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—  Loans inventory. In addition, through the on-site inspections of institutions, 
highly detailed loan-by-loan information is available as is that on the collateral 
(if any) associated with the operation. Concerning collateral, the appraised 
value and the date of the latest appraisal are available, as is information on 
its geographical location. The loan-by-loan information here makes up the 
banks’ lending portfolio in its entirety. This level of detail is also available for 
foreclosed assets. The loans inventory, and the details provided on collateral, 
comprise the underlying information for the calculation of the collateral 
values and that of the foreclosed assets.
   These granular databases provide for detailed information on more than 30 
million loans with their respective collateral, and some 3.5 million credit 
facilities.
—  Credit Risk Distribution (DRC, by its Spanish abbreviation) table. What are 
involved here are supervisory reports made available to each institution in 
which the lending portfolio is detailed with a specific segmentation by 
purpose of the operations, and which allow the accounting information 
prepared by institutions to be reconciled with the details of the loans in the 
aforementioned loans inventory. This information is used as an anchor point 
and a means of reconciliation of the different databases used.
—  Institutions’ projections of their income statements. The projections made by 
institutions of their income statements over the time horizon of the exercise 
are also available. This information is used, after conducting a plausibility 
analysis, as detailed below, to project profits before provisions.
—  Other information. Other information that institutions send periodically to the 
Banco de España as a result of their regulatory obligations or of supervisory 
requirements is also used. This includes, inter alia, information on balance 
sheets, income statements, the regulatory capital ratio and own funds 
requirements.
The expected loss over the analysis period is the result of expected losses for performing 
loans, for loans classified as doubtful initially and that arising from foreclosures. For the 
portfolio of performing loans, the parameters for calculating the expected loss are the 
probability of default, the loss in the event of default and exposure in the event of default. 
For doubtful loans (given that they are already in a situation of default, i.e. their probability 
of default is 1), losses given default and the exposure must be calculated. Finally, the 
expected loss for foreclosed assets will depend on the projection of their value at the time 
of sale. Detailed below is the methodology applied for the calculation of each of the 
parameters needed to calculate the expected loss.
The probabilities of default are estimated using the loan-by-loan information from the 
CCR. The loan-by-loan data are aggregated by credit segment in accordance with those 
included in the DRC statements which, as stated above, are the supervisory templates 
used as the starting point for obtaining the initial exposure in each portfolio and also for 
grounding and appropriately reconciling the different databases used. The six credit 
segments considered are: real estate developers, construction, corporates, SMEs, retail 
mortgage lending and consumer credit. This segment-based aggregation is done for each 
bank and over the period from 2000 to date in order to construct a panel with which to 
3.4  Constituent elements 
of the expected 
losses projection
3.4.1  PROBABILITIES OF DEFAULT
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estimate a probability of default model based on macroeconomic variables for each 
lending portfolio segment. Modelling probabilities of default with macroeconomic variables 
enables the former to be linked to the macroeconomic scenarios used in the exercise.
Once the probabilities of default have been modelled, and thereby linked to the scenario, 
three adjustments are applied to them.
—  The probabilities of default are anchored to the detailed information on credit 
portfolios in the Credit Risk Distribution table. As a result, consistency is 
ensured between databases by classifying information on credit sub-
portfolios, since the information available in the CCR is segmented by 
economic activity codes (NACE codes), and what is taken directly from the 
institutions’ loan portfolio is segmented in accordance with the purpose of 
the loan.
—  In calculating the probability of default, the relative size of the default is taken 
into consideration. In this regard, potential biases in estimated probabilities of 
default are thus avoided when the degree of heterogeneity of the size of loans 
in a portfolio is high. 
—  The probabilities of default are adjusted to incorporate the detailed refinancing 
analysis conducted by the Banco de España over the course of 2013 (see 
Box 2.1). The amount of loans recently reclassified from performing or sub-
standard to doubtful are taken into consideration to adjust the starting point 
of the probabilities of default upwards 
Loss in the event of default is broken down into two factors. Once a loan becomes doubtful, 
it will be necessary to evaluate what possibility there is of it being cured, i.e. that it may be 
recovered and return to a situation of normality (first factor). If the loan has become 
doubtful and is not cured, the effective associated loss (second factor) will have to be 
calculated, taking into account the value of the collateral, if any.
When a loan defaults, it is possible with the passage of time that the borrower may find 
sufficient funds to repay the debt and, therefore, the default “is cured”. The information 
available in the CCR enables cure curves to be calculated, distinguishing between the six 
credit segments considered. That is to say, it is estimated, for each segment on the basis of 
the CCR loan-by-loan information, what percentage of the doubtful asset will be recovered on 
average, once a certain time in doubtful status has elapsed. In calculating cures, a distinction 
has been made between those loans that have been less time in a situation of default and 
those others that have had this status for longer. This is because, conceivably, the longer a 
loan has a default status, the more difficult it will be for it to return to normal.
The calculation of the cure curves based on the CCR is not free from difficulty, as the loans 
that have been cured are not specifically identified. The difficulty arises because, when a 
loan is removed from the doubtful category, it is not possible to identify accurately the 
underlying reason. To resolve this, it has been opted with the current roll-out of the FLESB 
to take the more conservative option, based on the expert criterion of the consultant who 
has offered advice on the development of the FLESB.
For operations that default and that do not cure, the associated losses must be calculated. 
Thus, operations which do not cure finally turn into a loss if there is no collateral posted, 
3.4.2  LOSS IN THE EVENT OF DEFAULT 
Cures
Valuation of collateral
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or else the value of the collateral has to be calculated to obtain the residual value that the 
unpaid loan can yield once the attendant guarantee has been liquidated. 
As the FLESB currently stands, the granular information available to the Banco de España 
and that obtained from the external consultant in the stress tests conducted last year has 
been intensively used. As earlier discussed, this information consists of the geographical 
location of the collateral, the type of asset, the appraised value at the latest available date 
and specific elements that reduce the value of the collateral owing to the potential 
existence of biases in appraisals, upkeep and management costs of such collateral, and 
the discounts institutions apply when selling such collateral (steps 3, 4 and 5 in Chart 3.2). 
Prices that are as granular as possible (by province, type of collateral, etc.) have been used 
to update the value of the collateral at the time it is used as a starting point of the forward-
looking exercise, as has an own model to project the prices of such collateral over the time 
horizon in which the exercise is conducted (steps 1 and 2 in Chart 3.2). As a result, the final 
value of the collateral is obtained which, once deducted from the unpaid exposure, 
provides the final value of the loss in the original loan operation.
Given the granularity of the information available in 2011 and 2012 (the latter being the 
starting point of the exercise), it has been necessary to proportionately adjust the amounts 
so that there should be no discrepancies and to adjust the initial population characteristics 
to the level of the arrival point, as well as considering the transfer of assets from the Group 
1 and 2 institutions to Sareb.
The CCR contains information on credit facilities, the amount drawn down at each point in 
time, the amount available and the date on which a company defaults. Accordingly, it is 
possible to calculate the drawn down credit conversion factor for each operation or, 
expressed otherwise, the additional amount of credit a company has by using its credit 
facility precisely at the moment prior to default. The conversion factors are calculated by 
credit segment and measure the increase in credit drawn down as a proportion of the 
amount available in the final period before default. If this is calculated operation by operation 
and aggregated by segment, implicit regard is had to differences in conversion factors that 
may arise as a result of the different collateral provided under each credit facility. 
The foregoing treatment applied for the calculation of the value of collateral is very similar 
to that applied to the calculation of expected losses on foreclosed assets (see Chart 3.2). 
In this case, in addition to taking into account the transfers to Sareb, stratified sampling 
has been used to move from highly granular asset-by-asset information, as at end-2011, 
3.4.3  EXPOSURE IN THE EVENT
OF DEFAULT
3.4.4  FORECLOSED ASSETS
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
COLLATERAL VALUATION ADJUSTMENT TO CALCULATE LOSS GIVEN DEFAULT CHART 3.2 
Indexed 
to 2012 
1 
Indexed 
to 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Third-party 
appraisal Sale 
discounts 
Management 
costs 
Book value 
2011 
Value updated 
to 2012 
Value updated 
to 2015 
Final value 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 46 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2013
to more aggregated information in the case of 2012, the rest of the adjustments being very 
similar to those seen for collateral.
As a result of the interaction between the highly granular databases of loans, collateral, 
credit lines and foreclosed assets, the models estimated and the various scenarios used, 
it is possible to obtain estimations of expected losses by portfolio, by bank and under 
various macroeconomic scenarios. These expected losses are compared with the 
resources available at each bank for absorbing them.
The first element available for absorbing expected losses are the loan-loss provisions 
existing at the starting date of the exercise. In this case, all the existing provisions for 
business in Spain are calculated because it is deemed that they could all be used in the 
hypothetical case that expected losses materialised. Only existing provisions in Spain are 
used, excluding those from abroad, because the target of this forward-looking exercise is 
the loan portfolios of the resident private sector in Spain. Expected losses in the first year 
are compared with the volume of provisions. If they are lower, the surplus provisions are 
used in the following year to absorb the losses of the second year, and so on.
If at any time the provisions are insufficient for absorbing expected losses, the amount not 
covered is charged to profits. Consequently, once the provisions have been exhausted, it 
is possible to use profits (before provisions) to absorb the remaining expected losses. This 
requires estimating profits before provisions for the time horizon considered and for each 
scenario.
In order to project profits before provisions, as they currently stand, the FLESB has 
adopted an all-encompassing approach.
—  An econometric model of different factors determining the various items in 
the income statement was developed, linking these items to the usual 
macroeconomic variables. The level of detail is significant, with ROA, the 
cost of liabilities, the volume of interest-earning assets and interest-bearing 
liabilities, fees (broken down by type), gains or losses on financial transactions 
and operating expenses having being modelled separately. This model 
provides for an aggregate numerical reference, linked to each macroeconomic 
scenario, which enables the greater or lesser plausibility of the complementary 
expert approach developed to be assessed.
—  An expert approach has been developed, based on the forward-looking 
information on each institution’s balance sheet and income statement, to 
which access is had as a result of the banking supervision function. The 
information thus obtained is filtered and in some cases institutions’ over-
optimistic estimations are adjusted both in terms of prices and volumes. The 
consistency of the information with the aggregate macroeconomic scenario is 
also checked. Similarly, the impact of the expected losses is incorporated by 
suspending the accrual of interest in proportion to these losses. The exercise 
involving the expert estimation of profits before provisions is complemented 
by adjusting the other items to the information available to the supervision 
teams, which filter the institutions’ plans, and to other judgments which are 
taken into account in the scenario. For institutions with business abroad an 
estimation of their net profit, with a 30% haircut, is used, in line with the 
common practice in this type of exercises performed recently in Spain.
3.5  Absorption of losses
3.5.1  PROVISIONS
3.5.2  PROFITS BEFORE PROVISIONS
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   Once profits before provisions adjusted for outliers and in line with the 
baseline scenario and the above-mentioned aggregate quantitative forecast 
are obtained, the results under scenarios which are further removed from the 
baseline scenario are obtained, incorporating the effect of higher expected 
losses in net interest income and more stringent assumptions in the evolution 
of the other captions, using the supervisor’s expert opinion and econometric 
estimations as a point of reference.
Once the provisions and profits available to the institutions have been used, the remainder 
of the expected losses impacts capital directly, reducing it by that amount . The net amount 
of capital is compared with risk-weighted assets to determine the solvency ratio. Risk-
weighted assets show changes in assets according to the scenario.
The comparison of this ratio at the end of the analysis period with the capital threshold 
established determines the institution’s relative solvency position in the various scenarios 
envisaged. The supervisor will use this information in conjunction with other data to enrich 
the dialogue process with the institution about its current and future capital levels in 
relation to its risk level.
As explained throughout this chapter, the FLESB has been conceived as a tool necessarily 
subject to development and continuous refinements. As it currently stands, it has been 
deemed of use for evaluating the solvency position of the Spanish banking sector as part 
of a forward-looking exercise that considers different macroeconomic scenarios. 
The aim is to perform a forward-looking exercise which, taking December 2012 as a 
starting point, spans a three-year period from 2013 to 2015.
The exercise targets the resident private sector’s credit portfolio in respect of business in 
Spain, along with foreclosed assets. The institutions’ credit portfolio has been divided into 
six segments (real estate developers, construction, corporates, SMEs, retail mortgage 
lending and consumer loans), which have been modelled taking into account the 
characteristics proper to the loans and collateral comprising them.
It has been borne in mind that in December 2012 and in February 2013 the Group 1 and 2 
institutions, respectively, transferred assets to Sareb, with these assets and the provisions 
set aside for them therefore being excluded from the scope of the analysis.
The set of institutions considered are those which were already included in the exercise 
conducted last year by the external consultant as part of the implementation of the MoU, 
i.e. Santander, BBVA, La Caixa, Kutxabank, Sabadell, Bankinter, Unicaja, BMN, Liberbank, 
Popular, NCG, CX, BFA-Bankia, Ibercaja-Caja3, and CEISS.
The benchmark capital ratio for this exercise is Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), as defined 
in the CRR/CRD IV, the regulations that transpose Basel III into the EU regulatory framework. 
In accordance with these regulations, both the calculation of CET1 and the application of 
specific deductions and filters needed for its calculation will be progressive during its 
phase-in from 2014 to 2017. The rules envisage a minimum regulatory capital (in terms of 
3.5.3  FINAL IMPACT ON CAPITAL
3.6  Approach 
of the exercise
1  If any institution has an asset protection scheme which guarantees coverage of a portion of the losses by an 
external third party, this will have been taken into account in the final calculation of the expected loss absorption 
capacity.
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CET1) of 4% in 2014, which would be increased to 4.5% from 2015. For the purposes of 
this forward-looking exercise, the timetable set by the regulations for the definition of the 
CET1 ratio that will be in force at each point in time2 has been considered.
In performing this exercise, two alternative and less probable scenarios, characterised by a 
more unfavourable performance of the main macro-magnitudes, have been considered along 
with a baseline macroeconomic scenario. To design these scenarios a macroeconometric 
model was used in which a set of technical assumptions was introduced regarding the path 
of the main exogenous variables, such as interest rates and the growth of world markets, up 
to end-2015. 
In the baseline scenario, the economy experiences a modest recovery, which progressively 
gains momentum as private domestic demand increasingly accompanies exports as the 
driver of activity. In this scenario, the Spanish economy would leave behind the second 
recession it has undergone since the start of the crisis, although the level of GDP at the 
end of the exercise’s horizon would still be noticeably lower than the cyclical peak attained 
in 2008 Q1 (see Chart 3.3). What is involved, therefore, is a scenario of gradual growth, in 
which the process of correction and adjustment of the imbalances built up in the Spanish 
economy continues.
In the first alternative scenario, known as the unfavourable scenario, the Spanish economy 
would scarcely grow in the period considered (see Chart 3.3), meaning that cumulative 
output growth from 2013 to 2015 would be 1.7 pp lower than in the baseline scenario. This 
gap between cumulative GDP growth in the two scenarios matches that implicit in the 
forecasts of the IMF’s October 2013 World Economic Outlook, forecasts which, among 
those recently formulated by national and international agencies, are those that project a 
more adverse baseline scenario. In the construction of this scenario, consideration is 
given to a hypothetical worsening of financial conditions, a slowdown in Spanish export 
markets and a fall-off in the level of domestic private spending. In combination, these 
factors would give rise to a virtual flattening of GDP, with a more negative performance 
by the main variables of interest, such as unemployment and house prices, compared with 
the baseline scenario. 
3.7  Macroeconomic 
scenarios used 
in the exercise
2  Given that the exercise begins in 2013, it has been assumed, for the sake of consistency with the definition of 
the capital ratio, that the definition established in CRR/CRD IV for 2014 would have to be met as at that date.
PATH OF GDP UNDER DIFFERENT SCENARIOS CHART 3.3
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Finally, the second alternative macroeconomic scenario, known as the adverse scenario, 
would entail a fresh dip in the Spanish economy (see Chart 3.3). This scenario, which is 
assigned a very low probability of occurrence, would be the outcome of a combination of 
adverse shocks qualitatively similar to those of the foregoing unfavourable scenario, but 
on a more acute scale. Specifically, the gap between GDP growth in the baseline scenario 
and in this more pessimistic scenario would almost be double the cumulative relative loss 
in the unfavourable scenario, climbing to 3.2 pp, with a likewise more adverse impact on 
the other macro-financial variables. 
The results of the exercise show that the expected losses generated in the credit portfolio, 
and in the foreclosed assets portfolio, grow as the scenario worsens. That is to say, as the 
macroeconomic scenario moves away from the baseline scenario and pivots towards an 
adverse scenario whose likelihood of occurrence is low, the resulting expected losses 
naturally increase.
Thus, in the baseline scenario, the expected losses in the credit portfolio resulting from the 
exercise for the 2013-2015 period account for 7.6% of total credit. This percentage of 
expected loss would be 8.8% in the unfavourable scenario and would rise to 9.7% in the 
adverse scenario. If the expected losses associated with foreclosures are added, the 
percentages of total expected losses (losses on the credit portfolio plus those of the 
foreclosures over credit exposures plus foreclosures) increase in each of the scenarios. 
Thus, in the baseline scenario, the percentage of total expected loss would be 10.1%, 
standing at 11.3% for the unfavourable scenario and at 12.1% for the adverse scenario. 
The increase in the expected loss in the unfavourable scenario with respect to the baseline 
scenario is 12%, whereas this increase in the expected loss is 20.4% between the baseline 
and the adverse scenarios.
The resources available to withstand these expected losses, that grow in terms of the 
degree of severity of the scenario, follow the opposite path, i.e. they fall from the baseline 
scenario to the adverse scenario, but moderately so. On one hand, the volume of provisions 
the institutions have is constant in the three scenarios, as this is the amount that is already 
set aside on balance sheets at the start of the exercise. This amount accounts for 8.8% of 
the total exposure analysed. In relation to the overall expected loss in each scenario, the 
total provisions already set aside would account for 87.3% of total expected losses in the 
baseline scenario, 78% in the unfavourable scenario and 72.5% in the adverse scenario.
On the other hand, the resources available from the use of asset protection schemes3 
increase as losses do (i.e. there are more resources available from APSs in the adverse 
scenario than in the baseline one), but their relative increase and their total amount are of 
little significance for the institutions analysed as a whole. Hence, in the baseline scenario, 
the APSs available account for 1% of expected losses, for 1.2% in the unfavourable 
scenario and rise to 1.3% in the adverse scenario. 
Finally, institutions’ pre-provisioning profit-generating capacity diminishes as the scenario 
becomes more severe, essentially as a reflection of the greater reduction in activity and as 
a result of more defaults arising in the adverse scenario, which entails the interruption of 
the accrual of interest for a higher volume of assets. A further factor is the conservative 
3.8  Results of the 
exercise
3  Asset protection schemes (APSs) are resources available for absorbing expected losses for those institutions 
that have such schemes. They have been taken into account in each specific case, and always according to the 
concession and approval conditions under which these APSs were agreed.
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assumptions made in respect of the generation of income on financial transactions, which 
is considered to be zero in 2014 and 2015 under the adverse scenario, with only that 
recorded in the first half of the year being admitted in 2013. The pre-provisioning profit- 
generating capacity of institutions as a whole analysed in the baseline scenario would 
cover 58.2% of the expected losses generated in that scenario. As stated, the reduction in 
profits and, more importantly, the increase in total expected losses in the different scenarios 
explains the gradual reduction in this percentage of coverage. Thus, in the unfavourable 
scenario, the coverage of total expected losses with profits before provisions would be 
50.1%, while in the adverse scenario it would be 43.9%.
Accordingly, the results of the exercise for the set of 15 institutions analysed show a fairly 
comfortable solvency position at the aggregate level in 2015. Chart 3.4.A shows that, in 
the worst scenario, loss-absorption capacity exceeds expected losses by €28.6 billion. 
The CET1 capital ratio in 2015 for the institutions considered as a whole would be 11.3% 
in the baseline scenario, 10.8% in the unfavourable scenario and 10.2% in the adverse 
scenario (see Chart 3.4 B).
The methodology used (despite using quite granular information at the level of each 
institution) does not allow the prospective solvency position of each bank to be estimated 
precisely. However, the analysis shows that all the institutions would easily satisfy the 
minimum levels of regulatory capital, even in the adverse scenario.
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4  OTHER MATTERS
This chapter is dedicated to two issues that have differing degrees of repercussions, and on 
differing scales, for credit institutions. The first part reports on the main areas of progress in 
the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), a basic pillar for achieving a Banking 
Union in Europe. More from a regulatory than from a structural standpoint, several 
developments relating to consolidation accounting regulations are analysed. The aim here is 
to contribute to preventing controlled financial structures from being left outside the scope of 
consolidation, further providing for reporting improvements that enable an assessment to be 
made of the risks to which non-consolidated financial structures are exposed. Finally, the 
chapter reports on the monitoring of the financial assistance programme for Spanish banks.
As indicated in the last FSR, in June 2012 the Heads of State and Government of the 
European Union (EU) decided to create a single banking supervisor, with the aim of improving 
the quality of supervision in the euro area, promoting market integration and breaking the 
vicious link between confidence in banks and doubts over the sustainability of public debt. 
Underpinning the creation of a single banking supervisor was the special legislative procedure 
included in Article 127.6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which 
provides for the ECB to be vested with prudential supervisory powers over credit and other 
financial institutions, with the exception of insurance companies. 
On 12 December 2012, the Council of the European Union approved the Commission’s 
draft regulation on the SSM, which is defined as a European supervisory system comprising 
the ECB and the competent national authorities (CNAs) of the euro area countries and of 
those other Member States that wish to join.
During 2013 swift progress has been made in defining and preparing the SSM. On 22 May 
2013, the European Parliament (EP) expressed its support of the proposal, pending a final 
agreement on the attendant transparency and accountability arrangements. This inter-
institutional agreement was reached on 12 September by the ECB and the EP, and, 
hereunder, the EP will have extensive access to supervisory information, including: 
knowledge of the contents of the Supervisory Board’s meetings; approval of the designation 
of its chair and vice-chair, and the power to propose their dismissal; the power to initiate 
inquiries into supervisory errors; and the right to make written enquiries to the supervisor 
and to receive a prompt reply. 
On 15 October the EU Council adopted the draft regulation. Consequently, in conformity 
with its provisions, the ECB shall effectively assume the supervisory powers granted to it 
under the regulation twelve months after its entry into force, provided that progress in the 
practical implementation of the regulation should allow it.
The SSM is one of the three essential elements of the Banking Union, which also includes 
the establishment of a single resolution mechanism and a common deposit guarantee 
system. These three institutional pillars will further be strengthened by the implementation 
from January 2014 of the new capital requirements framework laid down by EU Regulation 
2013/575 and by Directive 2013/36/EU, and by the bolstering of the European Banking 
Authority (EBA), whose powers will be enhanced, inter alia, to perform stress tests and 
request information of EU credit institutions.
4.1  Developments 
concerning the 
Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM)
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The design of the second pillar of the Banking Union was launched on 10 July 2013, with 
the presentation by the European Commission of a proposal for a single resolution 
mechanism. This is currently being analysed in parallel by the working groups of the 
Council and the EP. They intend to set out their respective positions in October and initiate 
forthwith the pertinent “trilogies” phase, so as to conclude the legislative process as soon 
as possible, ideally in the first quarter of 2014. 
With regard to the SSM, following the mapping of the euro area countries’ credit institutions, 
it is estimated that somewhat more than 130 institutions, representing approximately 85% 
of the area’s banking assets, will be considered significant1 and, therefore, will be directly 
supervised by the SSM. In this connection, joint supervision teams (JSTs) will be formed, 
including experts from the ECB and from the CNAs. The joint supervision teams will be led 
by an ECB coordinator and each team will be responsible for the daily supervision of a 
significant banking group. The remaining institutions not deemed to be significant will 
continue to be supervised by the national authorities, although their supervisory decisions 
must conform to the rules, guidelines or instructions of the ECB, which may assume direct 
supervision of an institution if it considers this necessary.
The draft regulation seeks to establish a clear segregation between the ECB’s supervisory 
and monetary policy functions, with the aim of maintaining the ECB’s monetary policy 
independence. To this end, the above-mentioned Supervisory Board (on which both 
national supervisors and the ECB will be represented) will be created, assisted by a Steering 
Committee which will carry out preparatory tasks. In addition the draft regulation contains 
provisions, including most notably those relating to the segregation of staff from the two 
functions; the setting up of a mediation panel to settle discrepancies between the ECB’s 
Supervisory Board and its Governing Council; and financing supervision through charges.
The CNAs will continue to play an important role, especially during the initial stages of the 
new supervisory regime. As expressly acknowledged in the recitals of the draft regulation, 
“national supervisors have long-established expertise in the supervision of credit 
institutions within their territory and their economic, organisational and cultural 
specificities”. With regard to institutions considered significant, the CNAs shall: 
—  Assist the ECB in the preparation and application of supervisory decisions. 
—  Formulate draft decisions on specific matters (e.g. on the granting or revoking 
of authorisations or the taking of significant stakes).
—  Assist the ECB in the ongoing assessment of the position of credit institutions 
and in on-site verifications. 
—  Provide whatsoever information the ECB should require in the performance 
of its functions. 
The preparatory work for the SSM has focused in recent months on:
—  Mapping credit institutions in the euro area to determine the supervisory 
regime that will be applicable to them on the basis of the foregoing indications.
Joint supervision teams will be 
set up for supervised 
institutions…
… while it will be sought to 
clearly segregate the ECB’s 
supervisory and monetary 
policy functions
The CNAs will continue 
to play an important role
Preparatory work has been 
carried out in recent months
1  For the criteria governing whether an institution is considered significant, see the May 2013 Financial Stability 
Report, pp. 51 and 52.
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—  Writing the draft framework regulation on the organisation of its supervisory 
functions which the ECB, in consultation with the competent national 
authorities, and on the basis of a proposal by the Supervisory Board, should 
adopt in keeping with the proposed regulation for the SSM. This framework 
regulation shall also specify ECB/CNA forms of collaboration. 
—  The supervision manual for the main euro area credit institutions, which 
includes the methodology needed for the preparation of their risk profiles 
[namely the risk assessment system (RAS)]; the methodology for evaluating 
capital adequacy and liquidity; specific provisions relating to supervisory 
processes; and on-site inspection procedures. 
—  Laying down an outline for the regular sending of banks’ confidential returns 
to the SSM, which encompasses the drawing up of a proposal for 
standardisation. 
—  The preparation of the comprehensive prior review of the participating countries’ 
credit institutions, which is necessary from the legal standpoint for the ECB to 
assume supervisory responsibilities. This comprehensive assessment will 
include the identification and evaluation of general risk factors (the risk 
assessment system), an exhaustive balance sheet assessment and stress 
tests, the latter in conjunction with the EBA. The assessment of credit 
institutions’ balance sheets is scheduled to begin towards the end of the year. 
Historically, the resolution of accounting problems has been preceded by shortcomings 
and excesses during economic boom periods.
The crisis that broke in 2007 highlighted different practices for what are known as “special-
purpose vehicles” (SPVs). These are structures created with pre-set functioning 
mechanisms that evidenced a lack of control by the sponsor, and which received liquidity 
facilities or other credit enhancements that enabled them to acquire high credit ratings, 
sometimes evading consolidation thanks to simplistic interpretations of accounting rules. 
These structures not only exposed sponsor institutions to risks relating to the credit 
enhancements granted, but also, once assets became impaired or liabilities could not be 
rolled over, it was the sponsors who took the burden upon themselves.
Faced with this, in April 2008 the FSB called on accounting standard-setters (FASB and 
IASB) to improve the accounting of off-balance sheet exposures, by pushing through a 
process first initiated in 2003. The IASB released a draft definition of control in 2008, and 
IFRSs 10, 11 and 12 were finally approved in May 2011 for their application in 2013 (put 
back a year in the European Union). 
In accordance with IFRS 10, an entity controls another when it has the power to control its 
relevant activities, is exposed to variable returns and has the ability to influence returns 
from the investee.
The concept of controlling power is strengthened and broadened, and is not confined to 
financial and operating activities, but encompasses activities that are relevant for the 
entity. In this way SPVs that were previously consolidated exclusively because of exposure 
to risks and benefits will now be consolidated because they are controlled in exceptional 
but relevant circumstances, such as the management of loans in the event of default. 
4.2  New consolidation 
accounting criteria
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accounting criteria
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The exposure to variable returns, which is necessary for the existence of control and which 
means that the returns the entity obtains from the investee should be able to vary as a 
result of the latter’s performance and not be fixed, is evidenced not only by rights typically 
associated with control, such as dividends, but also by commissions, or by returns from 
economies of scale.
The standard seeks to apply control criteria which, on the basis of certain principles, 
provide for the resolution of issues that were previously addressed without allowing for 
nuances. These include the consideration of potential voting rights, the consideration of 
control when a majority of voting rights is not held, the explicit introduction of the 
requirement that control criteria be reviewed, the treatment of control when voting rights 
are not the relevant issue or the development of the figure of the agent (he/she who acts 
for the benefit of a third party with delegated decision-making powers). The standard thus 
seeks to avoid the widespread practice of quantitative limits in respect of exposure to risks 
and benefits, which previously determined the existence of control or the absence thereof. 
It also includes detailed guidelines on aspects to be considered if no investor has more 
than 50% of the voting rights, such as the stake of the other shareholders or shareholder 
agreements. Regarding potential voting rights, the standard adopts a less rigorous 
criterion, reflecting economic rationality in respect of exercising the right, with the fact that 
the rights may be exercised not being definitive. 
Another significant aspect of the modification is related to the importance of maintaining 
an internally consistent body of rules as a basis for a common and logical language. This 
reform achieves a single consolidation model (which is not dispersed across various rules) 
applicable to any type of institution in which an interest is held, be they institutions with 
voting rights or institutions in which voting rights are not a decisive factor in the existence 
of control.
The changes not only focus on improving the definition of control but also address another 
significant aspect: the information in the notes to financial statements (IFRS 12) on 
structures in which institutions have some type of interest, not necessarily in the form of a 
holding, but which are not consolidated. This would be the case of institutions sponsored 
by groups which do not have a holding, are not committed to providing any support but 
which remain concerned as it influences their reputation.
Finally, IFRS 11, which is applicable to joint arrangements, seeks to simplify matters by 
using only one method to record joint ventures.
According to the information disclosed by the listed companies, it is not estimated that 
amendments to the definition of control will have a significant impact on the consolidated 
statements of Spanish credit institutions. The purpose of this reform is not to introduce 
new criteria but for them to be applied homogeneously, avoiding financial structures which 
are controlled from being excluded from the scope of consolidation, at the same time as 
improving reporting to allow the assessment of risks to which they are exposed due to 
non-consolidated financial structures.
The fourth review of the financial assistance programme for Spanish banks took place 
from 16-27 September. As on previous occasions, a delegation from the European 
Commission, in liaison with the ECB, and accompanied by the EBA, the European Stability 
Mechanism and the International Monetary Fund, the latter in its role as programme 
monitor, met Spanish authorities, financial institutions and other private institutions. 
4.3  Review of the 
Financial Assistance 
Programme for 
Spanish banks
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The report will be published in mid-November. The main conclusion of the European and 
international institutions, as reflected in their public statements, is that the programme is 
moving ahead as envisaged.
Practically all the structural reforms of the financial sector have been accomplished, 
pending approval by Parliament of the Law on savings banks and bank foundations. 
Consequently, the framework of governance, regulation and supervision of the banking 
sector has been strengthened, enhancing its resilience in the face of potential future 
shocks.
The restructuring of institutions that have received assistance is progressing at a sound 
pace and the plans approved by the European Commission are being met under the latter’s 
terms. The Spanish banking sector’s liquidity situation and financing structure have 
continued to improve, against the background of progressively stabilising markets and 
access once more for Spanish banks to funding markets. Spanish institutions’ solvency 
position remains comfortable following the recapitalisation of parts of the banking sector, 
the transfer of real estate-related assets to Sareb, and the improvement in results so far in 
2013 compared with those in 2012.
Nonetheless, the broad economic setting advises maintaining close surveillance and 
supervision over the banking system, providing for sustained, proper diagnosis of the 
shock resilience and solvency of the Spanish banking sector to head off possible problems.
Lastly, the IMF recommends the adoption of pan-European policies, such as pushing 
ahead towards banking union and applying additional monetary policy measures.
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